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“ But the water problems of our world need not 
be only a cause of tension; they can also be a 
catalyst for cooperation...If we work together, a 
secure and sustainable future can be ours“ Kofi 
Annan, February 2002 
 
 
 
                                                   Source: Photo adapted from www.tigraionline.com 
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 ABSTRACT 
The aim of this research is to examine the Egyptian-Ethiopian water relations especially 
over the question of the Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD). The research theoretically and 
empirically investigates the possibilities of conflict and cooperation in the future of the 
Egyptian-Ethiopian water relations. The research then highlights the main incentives and 
deterrents to water cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia. Given the magnitude of 
untapped benefits that could be achieved from cooperation, the research explores the 
viability of the benefit-sharing model as a tool for reinforcing sustainable cooperation in 
the Blue Nile Sub-basin. As benefit-sharing is not a novel concept to the Nile Basin 
countries, the research highlights the key milestones achieved in this direction and the main 
challenges encountered. The GERD has been promoted as a benefit-sharing project that 
carries benefits to Ethiopia and other Nile Basin states and thus this study looks at potential 
costs and benefits of this project and draws conclusions accordingly. The research finally 
puts forward the idea of cooperation beyond the Nile File as a much-needed step to 
transcend long-standing water sharing issues that have hampered previous cooperation 
attempts for long years. The research argues that the current issue of the GERD needs to 
be allocated within a broader framework in order to create a wider room for negotiation 
and trade-offs. The methodology of this study depends on qualitative tools of analysis and 
uses secondary sources for data collection. This study is significant because the GERD 
project is creating controversy in the Blue Nile Sub-basin due to the uncertainties and 
anxieties around its implications on the downstream Nile states, especially Egypt. Since 
the GERD project is a fait accompli, there needs to be a visualization of future water 
relations between Egypt and Ethiopia. In order to find a way out of this stalemate, the two 
countries need to think of win-win solutions that cause no harm to any party involved by 
looking into different cooperation opportunities.  
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  Chapter 1  
1.1: Introduction   
There are over 286 transboundary basins shared by 151 countries around the world 
(Cuppari, 2017, p. 1). Management and distribution of shared transboundary waters has always 
remained a highly contentious issue on the regional and international level. Thus, sustainable 
and equitable management of the transboundary water resources present a top-priority issue for 
co-riparian states to avoid conflicts and boost cooperation.  
In Africa, with the exception of island states, every country has territory in at least one 
transboundary river basin (Awulachew et al, 2008, p. 1). There are around 80 major 
transboundary rivers and lakes in Africa which cover nearly 62% of the continent’s total 
territory (Ibid, p. 2). Some of the African river basins are shared by as many as eleven states 
such as the case of the Nile River Basin (Ibid). The Nile River Basin includes eleven states, 
namely Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. While the upstream states geographically control 
the Nile water sources, downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan) have enjoyed an 
uninterrupted flow of the Nile waters.   
Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan and a small part of Eritrea form the Eastern Nile 
Sub-basin (ENTRO, 2016). As per the 1929 and the 1959 Nile historical treaties, Egypt and 
Sudan get an annual water share of 55.5 and 18.5 billion m3 respectively. Based on Egypt’s 
quota of the Nile waters, the country has been described as a hydro-hegemon (Zeitoun and 
Warner, 2006; Ana Cascão, 2008). Upstream states (especially Ethiopia) have never considered 
themselves bound by the provisions of the 1929 and the 1959 water treaties. Despite that 
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objection, upstream states had not taken any serious steps to challenge the status quo due to 
different political and economic constraints that had occupied their agendas for years.    
Despite Egypt’s large share of the Nile waters (55.5 billion m3), the country is in fact 
the most vulnerable when it comes to water security due to its limited water resources, high 
population growth and mounting economic needs. Egypt receives the least rainfall of any Nile 
Basin country and is almost solely dependent on the Nile waters (Hassan & Al Rasheedy, 2011,  
p. 133). Around 97 percent of Egypt’s water needs comes from the Nile (Nunzio, 2013, p. 4), 
and almost 10% of Egypt’s electricity generation is produced from the Aswan Dam alone (Ibid, 
p.2).   
Ethiopia, on the other hand, provides around 86 per cent of the Nile water sources that 
descends from its ‘water tower’ highlands. The country has 12 river basins with an annual 
runoff volume of 122 billion m3 of water (Awulachew et al, 2007, p. 4). In addition, it has 
around 2.6-6.5 billion m3 of ground water potential (Ibid). Due to the lack of proper water 
management strategies, Ethiopia has suffered for long years from severe drought that resulted 
in a huge humanitarian crisis (Kimenyi & Mbaku, 2015, p. 98).   
Lately, arising issues such as climate change, new economic and development 
pressures, high population growth and declining water resources have impelled upstream Nile 
countries to demand renegotiating their shares of the Nile waters. The unilateral signing of the 
Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) has been the spark that ignited old tensions between 
upstream and downstream Nile riparians, more particularly between Egypt and Ethiopia. Both 
Egypt and Sudan had reservations about certain provisions that address the redistribution of the 
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water shares, particularly with Article 14 of the agreement (Al-Ahram, 2015). Article 14 
addresses the rights and the obligations of the Nile riparians towards each other’s water 
security (Ibid). Hence, the two countries refused to sign the CFA agreement, whereas Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda unilaterally signed it in 2010 and Burundi in 2011 (Leb 
& Wouters, 2013, p. 37).   
Following the disagreement over the CFA, a series of pivotal events unfolded in the 
region including the Arab Spring period and the new political landscape that has followed it. 
Additionally, the formation of the newest basin state, South Sudan, has caused a number of 
profound changes in the region on many different levels. Amidst that political turmoil, the 
Ethiopian government announced the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
(GERD) and its large reservoir in 2011. Since the announcement of the GERD project, the 
Egyptian-Ethiopian relations have been deteriorating over the question of the dam. The 
Egyptian government has been extremely concerned that this project might affect Egypt’s share 
of the waters that come from the Blue Nile and could eventually escalate to a serious water 
security issue.  
Egypt’s major concern is the GERD filling strategy, especially the first filling plan 
which will considerably decrease Egypt’s share from the Nile waters depending on its duration 
(ElNashar & Elyamany, 2017, p. 1). Until now, Egypt and Ethiopia have not agreed upon a 
final filling strategy that guarantees sufficient water flows to Egypt especially during the 
periods of prolonged drought (International Non-Partisan Group, 2014, p. 4). At this advanced 
phase of the GERD project, the two countries need to reach a quick agreement on the technical 
operations of the dam and the reservoir (Arab News, 2017).  
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Despite the ups and downs in the GERD discourse, in March 2015 Egypt has signed the 
Declaration of Principles (DoP) with Ethiopia and Sudan in which Egypt publicly declared its 
preliminary acceptance of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in accordance to the 
principles stipulated in that agreement (Salman, 2017, p. 204). The DoP is viewed as a 
significant milestone in building cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia after four years of 
continuous tensions (Al-Ahram, 2015). However, it has been criticized it for lacking any 
binding force (Arab News, 2017).   
Many reasons drove Egypt in the DoP direction. Firstly, the construction of the dam 
was already in a very advanced stage, and had clearly become a fait accompli (Salman, 2017, 
p. 204). Secondly, most regional and international allies to Egypt either endorsed the GERD 
project, or have remained silent about the issue (Ibid). Even Sudan, one of Egypt’s closest 
regional allies, recently declared its support to the GERD project (Ibid). Moreover, Egypt 
currently faces many internal threats such as the rising trend of water overuse, the rapid 
population growth, and the current economic plight that necessitate smooth coordination and 
cooperation with its riparian neighbors. The United Nations warn that Egypt could run out of 
water by 2025 (Nunzio, 2013, p. 4).   
It’s noteworthy that Egypt and Ethiopia share a long history of both conflict and 
cooperation. Despite their divergent water interests, the two countries have managed to achieve 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation on and beyond the Nile River. Although the two countries 
have not reached an effective cooperative framework, they have managed to contain their 
conflicts, so that they maintain their good neighborly relations for long years.  
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Given the aforementioned background, the Nile River is thus perceived to be a driver 
for either contest or consent between Egypt and Ethiopia. The ups and downs in the history of 
hydro-relations between Egypt and Ethiopia raise many questions marks over the future of the 
hydro politics of the Blue Nile especially upon the GERD completion.   
Hence, this research shall thoroughly analyze potential opportunities for reinforcing 
water cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia. It shall highlight some background information 
that explain the history of hydro-relations between Egypt and Ethiopia including significant 
water treaties and initiatives. It will also shed the light on some existing theories and paradigms 
that have been commonly repeated in different research work that concern the management of 
transboundary river basins.  A conceptual framework of benefit-sharing will be applied in to 
order to examine its relevance and viability to achieve cooperation on and beyond the Nile 
River.   
1.2: Research Questions   
Throughout this study, the researcher aims to find answers to the research questions in the 
literature review section and the subsequent chapters. The main research question is:  
- To what extent does the benefit-sharing model reinforce effective cooperation 
between Egypt and Ethiopia?  
Supportive questions are:  
 
- What are the main water issues between Egypt and Ethiopia?  
- What are the previous applications of the benefit-sharing model in the Nile Basin?  
- What are the shared benefits that the GERD project can bring to Egypt and Ethiopia?  
- What are the areas of cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia beyond the Nile File?  
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1.3: Background   
The Nile River, considered to be the longest watercourse in the world, crosses the 
borders of eleven states: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda (Swain, 2014, p. 675). The Nile 
represents a major source of livelihood to its eleven basin states which depend on it for 
different purposes including irrigation, hydropower generation, navigation and transportation 
(Ibid).   
The overall volume of the Nile’s annual water flow is about 84 billion cubic meters 
(Nunzio, 2013, p. 2). It has two main tributaries: The White Nile which originates from 
Burundi and the Blue Nile which descends from the Ethiopian ‘water tower’ highlands (Swain, 
2014, p. 675). The Nile Basin itself is divided into several sub-basins. Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, 
South Sudan and a small part of Eritrea lie in the Eastern Nile Sub Basin (ENTRO, 2016). The 
Eastern Nile Sub Basin covers an area of 2,695,300 km2 and is sub divided into other sub 
basins: main Nile (44 %), the Baro-Akobo-Sobat and White Nile (26 %), the Abbay/Blue Nile 
(17 %) and the Tekeze-Atbara (13%) (Ibid)  
1.3.1: Egypt’s Water Profile  
   Egypt is the furthest downstream Nile riparian state. The country depends on the Nile  
River to supply around 97% of its freshwater needs (Azarva, 2012, p. 461). As stipulated in the  
1929 and the 1959 water treaties, Egypt’s total share of the Nile waters is 55.5 billion m3/year 
which mainly comes from the Blue Nile and the rest of it comes from the White Nile (Kimenyi 
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& Mbaku, 2015). Other noteworthy sources of water include groundwater, treated water1 and 
desalinated sea water (Salim, 2012, p. 12). Egypt has two groundwater aquifers: one in the Nile 
Basin and the other one is in the Western Desert (Azarva, 2012, p. 462). The groundwater in 
the Western Desert reservoir is a nonrenewable source and requires a massive budget for its 
extraction (Ibid). Egypt is considered to be the driest country in Africa as it only receives a 
total of 51mm of rainfall per year and the southern parts of the country almost receives no 
share of rainfall as only 10 mm may fall once every ten years (Ibid, p. 461).   
The current population of Egypt is 97 million with 2.5% growth rate per year (CIA, 
2017) and is expected to rise to 140 million by 2050 (Nunzio, 2013, p. 4). As the population 
increases, the demand for fresh water sources increases to supply its needs for agriculture, 
industry, electricity production and domestic use. With Egypt’s rapid population growth, the 
per capita water availability is expected to reach 500 m3/year, which means ‘absolute scarcity’, 
by the year 2025 (Hefny & Amer, 2004, p. 43). Therefore, securing an interrupted flow of the 
Nile Waters is a top-priority issue for Egypt.  
1.3.2: Ethiopia’s Water Profile  
Ethiopia is the most upstream Nile Riparian state. The country has 12 major river 
basins, with an annual flow of approximately 122 billion m3 of water (Noel et al, 2007, p. 15).  
Ethiopia’s water resources are mostly concentrated in the western part of the country which is 
inhabited by only 33% of the population, while the rest of the population (67%) reside in the 
                                                 
1 Treated water should not be counted as a percentage of Egypt’s total share of water because it is a reused source 
(Salim, 2012, p. 12). 
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eastern part and live off 11% of the surface water resources (Ibid). A large portion of the 
surface water flow of Ethiopia feeds into downstream countries (Ibid). The Ethiopian ‘water 
tower’ highlands alone provide 86 per cent of the total water of the Nile, distributed as: the 
Abay Blue Nile (59%), Sobat (14%), and Atbara Black Nile (13%) (Swain, 2014, p. 675).  
Another important water resource in Ethiopia is the annual rainfall. It is estimated that  
Ethiopia annually receives an average of 850 mm rainfall (Noel et al, 2007, p. 14). The western 
side of Ethiopia receives a unimodal rainfall that starts in February/March and ends in 
October/November (Ibid). Whereas the eastern parts have bimodal rainfall seasons, with one 
major and one minor season (Ibid). Major portion of the rainfall waters (around 60%) is 
consumed in savannah and grassland types of land and around 13% is diverted into river and 
lakes flows (Ibid).   
Due to the uneven distribution of Ethiopia’s surface and rainfall water resources, 
groundwater resources become a critical water resource due to its abundance throughout the 
country (Noel et al, 2007, p.15). It is estimated that Ethiopia has groundwater potential of 2.6 
billion m3/year that are mismanaged and poorly developed (Ibid). Different studies, including 
one developed by G. Hailemichael in May 2004, have shown that the development of 
groundwater is the ultimate solution to save Ethiopia from any water scarcity threats that are 
projected to arise in the near future (Ibid).   
Ethiopia is a country with high population that grows with annual rate of 2.9% (CIA,  
2017). Despite Ethiopia’s multiple water resources, the country has suffered for long years 
from severe drought that resulted in a huge humanitarian crisis (Kimenyi & Mbaku, 2015, p. 
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98). In order to alleviate poverty and boost economic development, Ethiopia has started 
planning several new water projects on the Nile including the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam (Kimenyi & Mbaku, 2015, p. 98).  
1.3.3: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)  
The idea of establishing the GERD dates back to the 1950s and its construction site was 
initially planned by the US Bureau of Reclamation (Madani & Islam, 2017, p. 257). It is 
located on the Blue Nile River, around 20 km from the Ethiopian-Sudanese border (IPoE 
report, 2013, p. 7). Only in years 2009 and 2010, the Ethiopian government started to review 
the studies of the GERD project for implementation (Madani & Islam, 2017, p. 257).   
The GERD is part of the ‘larger Millennium’ Project led by the Ethiopian 
Revolutionary Democratic Front that came into power in 1991 with a vision to build a 
democratic system and unite the whole society around a shared goal (Abdelhady et al, 2015, p. 
74). As such, the GERD symbolizes national unity by bringing together more than 80 ethno-
linguistic groups (Ibid).   
In 2011, the public announcement of the GERD project had resulted in a lot of 
controversy over the water security of the downstream countries especially Egypt.  
The construction budget of the GERD is 4.2 billion USD (Upadhyay & Gaudel, 2017, p. 19).  
China funds around 30 percent of the project and the rest of the budget is managed by the 
Ethiopian government through selling treasury bonds, deducting salaries of the state employees 
and collecting donations, both inside and outside Ethiopia (Abdelhady et al, 2015, p. 74).   
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The dam itself is of 145 meters height and its reservoir covers an area of 1,874 square 
kilometers with a storage capacity of 74 billion cubic meters (IPoE report, 2013, p. 7). As per 
the pronouncements of the Ethiopian Government, the main objective of the dam is 
hydropower generation with a capacity to produce 15,692 GWh of electricity annually 
(Upadhyay & Gaudel, 2017, p. 19).  
Currently, there is an ongoing debate between Egypt and Ethiopia over the dam’s filling 
strategy. Ethiopia has specified two filling phases: the first filling and the complete filling 
(Arab News, 2017). The first filling phase is the period during which the reservoir reaches a 
certain capacity, so that the dam should start generating power (Ibid). Whereas the complete 
filling is the phase where the dam reservoir reaches its full capacity (74 billion cubic meters) 
(Ibid).  
 
 
Figure 1: Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) 
Source: Adopted from Habteyes et al, 2015, p. 1238 
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1.3.4: Historic Nile Treaties and Agreements which include Egypt and Ethiopia (in 
chronological order)   
The Pre-Egyptian independence Nile treaties (1891, 1902, and 1906 treaties)   
Under the British colonial rule, the Egyptian hydropolitics and all other external matters 
were primarily managed by Britain (Hassan & Al Rasheedy, 2007, p. 33). Same case applied to 
other African countries in the Nile River basin that were also colonized by other foreign powers 
such as Italy, France, Belgium and Germany (Ibid).   
In 1891, Britain (on behalf of Egypt) and Italy (on behalf of Eritrea) concluded the 
protocol of Rome which stipulated that Italy would refrain from building any projects on the 
Nile Atbara (Tekezze) that could affect the downstream flow of water to Egypt (Hassan & Al 
Rasheedy, 2007, p. 33).  
In 1902, Britain (on behalf of Egypt) and Menelik II of Ethiopia signed the Addis 
Ababa agreement that bound the two parties to preclude any projects on the Blue Nile, Lake 
Tana and the Sobat River which would affect the normal flow of their waters to the 
downstream states, unless there is a joint consent signed the two by parties as well as Sudan 
(Hassan & Al Rasheedy, 2007, p. 33).    
In 1906, Britain (on behalf of Egypt) and Belgium (on behalf of Belgian Congo, now 
the Democratic Republic of Congo) signed the London treaty that included a commitment by 
an independent Congo not to construct or develop any constructions on or near the river 
Semliki, a tributary of the Nile River, that would reduce the volume of waters entering Lake 
Albert (Hassan & Al Rasheedy, 2007, p. 33).  
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In the same year (1906), a tripartite agreement was concluded between Britain, France 
and Italy that stipulated a commitment to maintain the unity of Ethiopia and to protect the 
interests of Great Britain and Egypt in the Nile basin in regard to the regulation of the waters of 
River Nile and its tributaries (Hassan & Al Rasheedy, 2007, p. 33).  
The post-Egyptian independence Nile treaties (1929 and 1959)   
The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement   
In 1929, Egyptian-British Nile River treaty was signed which allocated the shares of the  
Nile waters between Egypt and Sudan (Ferede & Abebe, 2014, p. 62). In this treaty, Egypt 
recognized Sudan’s share in the Nile waters while reserving its own historic and natural rights 
with respect to the Nile. The treaty allocated a share of 48 billion cubic meters to Egypt and 4 
billion cubic meters to Sudan. The agreement stipulated the following (Ibid, p. 61):   
“No irrigation or power works are to be constructed or taken on the Nile or its tributaries, or 
on the lakes from which it flows in so far as all these are in Sudan or in countries under British 
administration, and entail prejudice to the interests of Egypt”.   
Since Ethiopia was not included in the 1929 treaty, it does not consider itself bound to 
it. This treaty was criticized for emphasizing Egypt’s monopoly of the Nile waters at the 
expense of the upstream riparian states (Ferede & Abebe, 2014, p. 62).  
The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement   
Following its independence in 1956, Sudan expressed its dissatisfaction with the 1929 
agreement and requested renegotiating it (Ferede & Abebe, 2014, p.64). After a period of 
tensions between Egypt and Sudan over the shares of the Nile waters, the two countries agreed 
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in year 1959 to redistribute the quantities of the average annual Nile flow to be 18.5 billion 
cubic meters to Sudan and 55.5 billion cubic meters to Egypt (Ibid).   
This agreement stipulates that if any other riparian country objects over the Nile water 
resources, Sudan and Egypt shall handle it together (Ferede & Abebe, 2014, p. 64). If this 
objection concerns redistributing the Nile waters with another riparian state, Sudan and Egypt 
agreed to distribute the allocated amount equally from each country’s share (Ibid). On the one 
hand, the agreement gave Egypt the right to build the Aswan High Dam and on the other hand, 
it granted Sudan the right to construct the Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile in addition to some 
other irrigation and hydroelectric power generation projects (Ibid).   
Both colonial and post-colonial Nile agreements are characterized by unilateralism and 
misappropriation of the shares of the other riparian states. On the one hand, upstream Nile 
riparians do not consider themselves bound by these historic agreements as they were not part 
of them in the first place. On the other hand, Egypt contends that these treaties are 
nonnegotiable historical rights that should be respected by the upstream riparian states.   
  Generally, the Nile Basin cooperation at this phase was too low or non-existent due to the 
hydro-political tensions caused by the colonial and post-colonial Nile agreements. It was an era 
of rampant unilateralism, minimum or no Nile dialogue and entrenched mistrust between Nile 
riparian states. Starting 1967 onwards, the Nile riparians started shifting towards a multilateral 
strategy by forming different basin-wide initiatives that gather Nile riparians to discuss water 
issues and develop cooperative initiatives.   
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1.3.5: Regional and Bilateral Cooperative Initiatives in the Nile Basin which include Egypt and 
Ethiopia (in chronological order)   
The 1967 Hydro-Meteorological Survey of the Equatorial Lakes (Hydromet)  
In 1967, Egypt led an initiative to promote cooperation between the Nile basin countries 
and created the Hydro-Meteorological Survey of the Equatorial Lakes or (Hydromet) 
(Yohannes, 2009, p. 53). The Hydromet is considered to be the first intergovernmental project 
to promote cooperation in the Nile Basin area. It was supported by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) and the World Meteorological Organization (Ibid).   
The main purpose of the initiative was to collect and analyze meteorological data in the 
west Nile watershed (Yohannes, 2009, p. 53). Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and  
Burundi joined the Hydromet, while Ethiopia and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) refused 
to join objecting on the absence of the water redistribution issue from the organization’s mandate 
(Ibid, p. 54).   
In 1971, Ethiopia joined Hydromet only as an observer (Flintan & Tamrat, 2002, p. 
302). The Hydromet project ended in 1992, as member states wanted to replace it with another 
initiative that satisfies all riparian countries in order to achieve sustainable cooperation and 
coordination of the Nile waters affairs (Ibid).   
The 1983 UNUGU initiative  
The UNUGU is an initiative led by Egypt that aimed to reinforce brotherly relations 
between the Nile basin States as NUGU in Swahili means brotherhood (Mekonnen, 2010, p. 
426). The main purpose of establishing the UNUGU was to discuss all issues that concern the 
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Nile waters including agriculture, resources management, promoting economic, technical, and 
scientific cooperation between the riparian states (Ibid).   
Sudan, Uganda, DRC, and the non-riparian Central African Republic, Burundi, Rwanda,  
and Tanzania joined the initiative, whereas Ethiopia and Kenya participated as observers 
(Mekonnen, 2010, p. 426). Despite the effective role that the UNUGU played in uniting the 
riparian states under one institutional framework, it did not accomplish its main goal of creating 
sustainable cooperation (Ibid).  
This failure has been attributed to the fact that some riparian states perceived it as another  
hegemonic tool that Egypt created to support its interests in the Nile affairs (Mekonnen, 2010, p. 
426). Other reasons for failure is the absence of Ethiopia and Kenya, two important upstream 
riparian states, from the UNUGU membership (Howell & Allan, 1994, p. 361).   
The 1992 TECCONILE  
The Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and  
Environmental Protection of the Nile (TECCONILE) was established in 1992 by Egypt, 
Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire (DRC) (Howell & Allan, 1994, p.361). Other 
Nile riparians, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya, Burundi and Eritrea, joined as observers (Ibid). 
TECCONILE was initially planned to be an interim project for a period of three years with an 
end goal to establish a permanent basin-wide institution (Ibid).   
The 1993 Framework for General Cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia  
This accord is considered to be the first bilateral framework between Egypt and Ethiopia 
in their post-colonial era (Tedla, 2013, p. 4). It was signed in July 1993 in Cairo between former 
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president Hosni Mubarak and late Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi (Ibid). This 
framework agreement mostly covered “the issue of the use of the Nile waters “(Talwar, 2013, p. 
80). In the agreement, Egypt and Ethiopia agreed to “to promote their economic and political 
interests as well as the stability in the region” (Ibid). Although this agreement does not specify 
methods of cooperation, it clearly emphasizes that the two countries need to work together to 
reach mutually agreeable solutions (Ibid, p. 81). The two countries also agreed to “refrain from 
engaging in any activity related to the Nile waters that may cause appreciable harm to the 
interests of the other Party”, however, the framework itself does not include any provisions for 
enforcement (Ibid).  
The 1999 Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)  
The NBI marks a significant progress in the history of the Nile basin as it was the first  
time when all Nile riparian states (with the exception of Eritrea which participated as an 
observer) cooperated under a unified institutional framework (Mekonnen, 2010, p. 422). The 
NBI was intended to serve as a transitional arrangement to be later replaced by a permanent 
legal framework (Ibid). It consisted of the Nile-COM (Council of Ministers of water affairs), the 
Nile-TAC (Technical Advisory Committee and the Nile-SEC (Secretariat Office) located in 
Kampala, Uganda (Hamed & Ahmed, 2014, p. 24).   
The Nile Basin Initiative primarily aimed at increasing the level of trust and 
transparency between riparian states by supporting joint hydro-development programs 
(Mekonnen, 2010, p. 422). The shared vision of the NBI is “to achieve sustainable 
socioeconomic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common 
Nile Basin water resources” (NBI, 2017). The NBI manages two tracks: the technical and the 
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legal/political (Seide, 2014, p. 2). The technical track mainly focuses on the execution of 
regional projects such as socio-economic development, transborder trade, confidence building 
and environmental protection (Ibid). Whereas the legal/political track focuses on equitable and 
fair utilization of the Nile waters without causing any significant harm to any of the Nile 
riparians (Ibid). This initiative was perceived to be a very promising step towards more 
cooperative and productive era (NBI, 2017).   
The 2010 Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA)  
The CFA acts as the legal track of the NBI. The framework was a product of long  
negotiations that started in 1999 and was ready for signature in 2010 in the NBI to formulate a 
cooperative framework agreement between all Nile riparians (Salman, 2012, p. 20). Both Egypt 
and Sudan opposed the CFA insisting on preserving their rights to the current shares of the Nile 
waters in accordance with the 1959 Nile Treaty (Ibid).   
The CFA does not include any specific figures with respect to water distribution (Paisley &  
Henshaw, 2013, p. 10), however, it generally aims at guaranteeing equal and fair use of the 
Nile waters by all Nile Basin states (Salman, 2012, p. 21). It also states that each country has 
the right to utilize the waters of the Nile River Basin within its territories without doing any 
significant harm to other riparians (Ibid). The CFA does not include a formal mechanism for 
dispute settlement or exchange of information between Nile riparians (Paisley et al, 2013, p. 
10). Both Egypt and Sudan were not satisfied with the provisions of the CFA and demanded 
amendments of some of its articles (Ibid). The main debate was on Article 14 which requires 
all basin states to cooperate on ensuring and sustaining water security for all (Ibid). Article 14 
in the CFA states that:  
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Nile Basin states recognize the vital importance of water security to each of them. The States 
also recognize that cooperative management and development of the waters of the Nile River 
System will facilitate achievement of water security and other benefits. Nile Basin states 
therefore agree, in the spirit of cooperation:  
(a) to work together to ensure that all States achieve and sustain water security.  
(b) Nile Basin States therefore agree, in a spirit of cooperation not to significantly affect the 
water security of any other Nile Basin State.  
Egypt and Sudan requested to amend the wording of Article 14(b) to be “not to adversely  
affect the water security and current uses and right of any other Basin State” (Paisley et al, 
2013, p. 10). Egypt and Sudan backed their argument by consistently referring to the no-harm 
rule that is stipulated in the UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses2 (Ibid).   
The 2015 Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)  
In March 2015, the Declaration of Principles on the GERD was signed by Egypt, 
Ethiopia and Sudan (Tawfik, 2015, p. 2). The agreement consisted of ten principles, four of 
which focused on the GERD (Salman, 2016, p. 520). The ten principles are:   
(1) Principle of cooperation,  
(2) Principle of development, regional integration and sustainability,  
(3) Principle of no causing significant damage,  
(4) Principle of fair and appropriate use,  
(5) Principle of the dam’s storage reservoir first filling, and dam operation policies,  
                                                 
2 The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses was concluded in 
1997 and it is the only universal treaty that governs shared freshwater resources. Article 7 of the convention states 
that all states sharing an international watercourse need to “take all appropriate measures to prevent that cause of 
significant harm”. Source: UNECE, last retrieved on December 1st, 2017. 
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(6) Principle of building trust,  
(7) Principle of exchange of information and data,  
(8) Principle of dam security,  
(9) Principle of the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the State,  
(10) Principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes.  
 
Article 10 specifically deals with the mechanism of dispute settlement between the three  
countries (Salman, 2016, p. 522). It calls upon the three parties to resort to a peaceful 
settlement of disputes through negotiation or consultation (Ibid). If matters further escalated, 
the three parties may ask for mediation or conciliation, or they may refer the issue to the heads 
of state (Ibid). However, Article 10 does not mention anything on a resort to arbitration or to 
the International Court of Justice (Ibid).   
On the one hand, some Egyptian officials view it as a positive step towards reaching an  
agreement over the GERD as it succeeded to bring Egypt and Ethiopia to the negotiation table 
to discuss the main guidelines of operating the dam after a long period of tensions (Tawfik, 2015, 
p. 2). On the other hand, other Egyptian opinion leaders view that it is not fair to Egypt as it does 
not preserve its rights in the Nile waters and does not include any reference to the historical water 
treaties (1929 & 1959) (Ibid). Moreover, it did not include any clauses that commit Ethiopia to 
reconsider the size and the storage capacity of the dam (Ibid).  
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology   
This chapter explains the methodology used in the research. It provides an overview on 
the data collection and data analysis with an aim to further examine potential cooperative 
opportunities between Egypt and Ethiopia through the lens of the benefit-sharing framework.  
2.1: Methodology and Data Collection 
This research is a qualitative exploratory study that uses published sources of secondary 
data in order to draw comparisons and linkages between different opinions around 
transboundary water relations in general and the Egyptian-Ethiopian water relations in specific. 
Consequently, the research focuses on assessing the applicability of benefit-sharing model to 
achieve cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia from and beyond the Nile River and prevent 
future conflicts.  
Secondary data is collected from verifiable journal articles, research papers and 
publications as well as reports published by credible regional and international organizations 
such as World Bank, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and the United Nations Agencies. This 
research also uses official reports and documents published online by the governments of Egypt 
and Ethiopia. The use of secondary data is justifiable as the topic extends beyond the 
boundaries of Egypt and concerns other Nile Basin states. Due to the factor of time and 
logistics, it was challenging for the researcher to reach out to a wide-range of experts and 
scholars who represent different opinions about the topic. Thus, in order to avoid skewed 
findings, the researcher preferred to rely on published secondary data to present a broad and 
non-biased view of the Egyptian-Ethiopian water relations.   
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2.2: Data Analysis 
The starting point of the research is analyzing different conflict-cooperation arguments 
in the literature of transboundary water issues. The research then analyzes the same argument 
at the Egyptian-Ethiopian level. The aim of exploring these arguments is to reach a conclusion 
on whether transboundary water issues lead to conflict or cooperation. Following the 
conclusion part, the research explores the main deterrents and incentives to cooperation 
between Egypt and Ethiopia.  
After determining the main standpoints of the research, the research adopts the benefit-
sharing framework and the theory of issue linkage as its conceptual framework in order to 
explore more cooperative opportunities between Egypt and Ethiopia that can be achieved from 
and beyond the Nile River. The research focuses on two types of the benefit-sharing model: 
benefits from the river and benefits beyond the river. In one chapter, the research explores 
earlier applications of the benefit-sharing model in the Nile Basin countries and the main 
challenges encountered in its implementation process. The aim of this analysis is to examine 
the familiarity of the concept of benefit-sharing to the Nile Basin states including Egypt and 
Ethiopia. Following this chapter, the research explores possible benefit-sharing opportunities 
from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam through applying a cost-benefit analysis. The 
GERD project has been promoted as a benefit-sharing tool that carries a variety of benefits to 
Ethiopia, Egypt and other neighboring African countries and therefore, it is important to assess 
this project from a benefit-sharing perspective. 
Finally, the research looks at possible cooperation opportunities between Egypt and 
Ethiopia beyond the Nile file. This part of the analysis tries to link the current issue of the 
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GERD to a broad network of water and non-water related opportunities between Egypt and 
Ethiopia in order to explore more potential benefits beyond the river. Based on the research 
findings drawn from each chapter, a conclusion is formulated along with a number of 
recommendations for more sustainable and effective cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review   
This chapter starts by looking at different conflict/cooperation conceptualizations in 
transboundary water literature. This is followed by examining the same debate at the level of 
the Egyptian-Ethiopian hydro-relations. After seeking to understand the conflict-cooperation 
argument, a conclusion is drawn from the literature in order to set up the conceptual 
framework. The chapter ends with a discussion on influencing factors (incentives & deterrents) 
to water cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia: unilateralism, divergent interests, 
asymmetric relations and interdependence.    
3.1: Conflict or Cooperation?   
Managing shared water resources has been viewed as a complex issue as the uses (or 
misuses) in one country can easily impact the quality and quantity of water in other 
neighboring countries. Accordingly, there is a growing debate in both the policy and scientific 
literature that water can be a driver of conflict and possibly war between riparian countries 
(Elliot, 1991; Gleick, 1993; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Elhance, 1999). On the contrary, there are 
other studies that negate the water conflict scenario and strongly argue that water is a tool for 
cooperation (Wolf, 1998; Salman and de Chazournes, 1998; Turton, 2000; Sadoff and Grey, 
2002).   
There are different types of international water issues in which water can be an 
instrument of cooperation or a catalyst of conflict (Marty, 2001 cited in Mostert, 2003, p. 2). 
These issues have been grouped into three categories: (a) collective issues, (b) negative 
externality issues and (c) positive externality issues (Ibid). Collective issues are those problems 
that trigger similar concerns in all countries involved such as climate change issues (Ibid). 
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Negative externality issues happen when projects or activities in one country cause negative 
effects in another country such as water diversions (Ibid). Positive externality issues are those 
that result from activities that aim to achieve overall benefits to all countries concerned (Ibid).  
In regard to the above-mentioned scenarios, water conflicts are most likely to happen 
when there are negative externality issues and cooperation is most expected in the presence of 
collective issues (Mostert, 2003, p. 2) and/or positive externality issues. Yet, cooperation could 
happen in extreme negative externality issues as a result of countries’ willingness to maintain 
good neighborliness with one another (Ibid). Also, with respect to collective issues, conflicts 
could arise if there is mistrust or poor international relations between concerned countries 
(Ibid).  
Conflict is a broad term as it embraces a wide range of events where demands of 
different states may collide (Vinogradov et al, 2003, p. 25). This may range from minor 
disagreements and competition to the level of violent tensions that threaten international peace 
and security (Ibid). Cooperation can also come in different forms and scenarios. It can range 
from nominal informing to joint projects (Tesfaye, 2014, p. 128). Water cooperation can come 
in the form of treaties/agreements between upstream and downstream states which cover issues 
that concern distribution of water shares, water quality and water projects (Ibid). Another form 
of water cooperation is basin-wide joint management and/or governance initiatives (Ibid). The 
Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is one example of joint management forums that opened dialogue 
between upstream and downstream Nile riparians (Ibid). In joint management initiatives, 
member states agree on a shared vision and thus shift from unilateralism to a more inclusive 
strategy to foster regional development and achieve greater benefits (Ibid).   
 35 
 
 
Yoffee et al (2003) have ranked conflict and cooperation events on a scale of 15 points. 
This tool was named Yoffe’s Water Event Intensity Scale (WEIS).  
Figure 2: Yoffe’s Water Event Intensity Scale (WEIS). 
 
   Source: Yoffee et al, 2003 cited in Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008, p. 302   
In the water conflict argument, there are three issues that have been identified as the 
main reasons behind shared water disputes (Wolf et al, 2005, p. 81). These three issues 
concern: water quality, water quantity and timing of water flow (Ibid). Issues related to the 
quantity of water and its allocation can drive conflicts among riparian states especially when 
the resource is limited or scarce (Ibid). According to Homer-Dixon, water scarcity can result 
from environmental changes, population growth and the unequal distribution of the resource 
(Homer-Dixon, 1994, p. 3).   
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Water quality degradation and interrupted water flows are another alarming issues that 
can easily induce water conflicts (Wolf et al, 2005, p. 81). Problems in the quality of shared 
water can pose significant harm to both the environment and human health (Ibid). 
Repercussions of water pollution can be a sufficient reason for states to go into conflict, such as 
those in the Rhine River Basin3 (Ibid). Timing and coordination of water flow is another factor 
of contestation between upstream and downstream riparians in the presence of upstream dams 
and reservoirs (Ibid).    
Wolf et al (2004) brought forward another reason for water conflicts which is the poor 
management of water systems (Wolf, Carius, & Dabelko, 2004, p. 61). In this argument, the 
lack of water resources is not the major contributor to the water conflicts, but rather the lack of 
transparency, the weak institutional capacities and the lack of necessary infrastructure (Ibid). 
Lack of political will of co-riparians, absence of strong legitimate institutions, lack of technical 
water expertise and absence of a water-dispute settlement system are all sufficient factors that 
can result in a weak water management mechanism (USAID, 2014, p. 8). The management of 
transboundary water systems is a highly complex process due to divergent interests of the co-
riparian states (Wolf, Carius, & Dabelko, 2004, p. 61). Therefore, this complex process 
requires regular data sharing and continuous dialogue in order to build trust and confidence to 
foster cooperative action (Ibid).   
                                                 
3 As explained by MacQuarrie & Wolf (2013), contamination in the Rhine River caused severe siltation in the 
Rotterdam’s harbor. The costs of dredging the harbor were very high and thus Rhine’s users went into conflict 
over responsibility and compensation (Ibid). However, negotiations resulted in a peaceful settlement among the 
conflicting parties (Ibid).   
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Securitization4 of water issues has recently evolved as another factor that can trigger 
conflicts over shared river basins. Securitization is basically when an actor highlights a certain 
issue as an existential threat to a specific referent object, then calls for adopting exceptional 
measures in order to contain this threat (Buzan et al, 1998, pp. 22-23). The securitization of 
water is perceived to carry both benefits and risks (Gupta et al, 2016, p. 6). On the one hand, 
the positioning of the water as high politics could help raise global awareness and solidarity for 
all water-related issues and thus secure enough resources for its management (Ibid). On the 
other hand, extreme politicization of water makes it a matter of life and death and thus justifies 
the use of the extraordinary measures, which may sometimes mean the use of force, in order to 
control the situation (Ibid).    
At the other end of the conflict-cooperation spectrum, there is a group of analysts who 
view that the tendency towards cooperation is more abundant in transboundary water relations 
than the conflict scenarios. Empirically speaking, the University of Oregon carried out a study 
called “Basins at Risk” that analyzed the nature of relations among states that share rivers 
basins on a scale from conflict to cooperation (Wolf, 2007, p. 20). Based on the outcome of this 
study, the number of cooperative events outweighed the conflictual ones throughout the history 
of interstate relations that involved shared water resources (Ibid). The study revealed that 
between years 1948 and 2000, there were 1,228 cooperative events, while the number of 
conflicts was only 507 (Ibid). The overall findings of this research study can be summarized as 
follows:   
                                                 
4 The securitization theory was firstly introduced by the Copenhagen School of Barry Buzan, Ole Woever and others   
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(a) Most transboundary relations are cooperative. Out of 1,831 events, 1,228 cooperative 
relations were indicated (67.1%). The number of conflictual cases was 507 (27.7%) and 
the remainder 96 events were found to be non-significant (Wolf et al, 2003, p. 39).    
(b) Around two-thirds of the total 1,831 events were only verbal (between verbal hostility 
and verbal support) (Wolf et al, 2003, p. 39).   
(c) The main water issues are those related to infrastructure and quantity. 64% of the total 
studied events (conflicts and cooperation) were mainly about water quantity and 
infrastructure issues. Water quality-related events accounted for 6% (Wolf et al, 2003, 
p. 40).     
(d) Water can act as both unifier and irritant. Throughout history, water had been a source 
of contestation between neighboring countries such as India and Pakistan. However, 
water conflicts can eventually get resolved, even between bitter enemies. One example 
of water conflicts resolutions is the ‘picnic table’5 negotiations between Jordan and 
Israel (Wolf et al, 2003, p. 40)  
  
(e) Co-riparian states cooperate over a wide variety of issues that concern water quality, 
water quantity, hydroelectric power and overall economic development (Wolf et al, 
2003, p. 40) 
    
Sadoff and Grey (2005) argue that there are many positive incentives linked to water 
cooperation on the social, environmental and economic levels. This wide range of benefits that 
come with water cooperation encourage hostile states to commit to cooperation and overcome 
conflicts (Bencala & Dabelko, 2008, p. 24). Benefits from water cooperation are categorized 
into four different types (Sadoff & Grey, 2005, p. 421). Firstly, benefits from the river in the 
form of hydropower, food, navigation and tourism (Bencala & Dabelko, 2008, p. 24). 
Secondly, benefits to the river from a better managed ecosystem (Ibid). Thirdly, benefits 
beyond the river in the form of economic integration and increased development (Ibid). 
Fourthly, decreasing river-related costs as a result of preventing conflicts (Ibid).  
                                                 
5 The ‘picnic table’ talks were secret rounds of negotiations between Jordan and Israel to resolve their conflicts on 
the Jordan River   
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Table 1: Types of Benefit-Sharing 
Type The Challenge The Opportunities 
Type One: Increasing 
Benefits to the River  
Degraded water quality, watersheds, 
wetlands and biodiversity 
Improved water quality, river flow 
characteristics, soil conservation, 
biodiversity and overall sustainability  
Type Two: Increasing 
Benefits from the River  
Increasing demands for water, sub-
optimal water resources management and 
development  
Improved water resources management for 
hydropower and agricultural production, 
flood-drought management, navigation, 
environmental conservation, water quality 
and recreation  
Type Three: Reducing 
Costs because of the 
River  
Tense regional relations and political 
economy impacts  
Policy shift to cooperation and development, 
away from dispute/conflict; from food & 
energy self-sufficiency to food & energy 
security; reduced dispute/conflict risk and 
military expenditure   
Type Four: Increasing 
Benefits Beyond the 
River  
Regional fragmentation  Integration of regional infrastructure, 
markets and trade 
  Source: This table has been copied from Sadoff, C. W., & Grey, D. (2005).  
3.2: Conflict and Cooperation at the Egyptian-Ethiopian Level   
The Nile water conflicts are generally characterized by some distinctive features: (a) 
downstream countries’ high dependence on the Nile waters that originate from upstream states, 
(b) upstream countries’ limited utilization of the Nile water despite their geographical position 
and (c) Egypt’s control of a large share of the Blue Nile’s waters due to its powers (Mason, 
2004, p. 167) (Whittingon & Wu, 2006, p. 3). Due to its position as the farthest downstream 
state, Egypt is always concerned that water development projects in Ethiopia would obstruct 
the normal flow of the waters downstream (Mason, 2004, p. 171).   
According to Homer-Dixon (1994), “Conflict is most probable when a downstream 
riparian is highly dependent on river water and is strong in comparison to upstream riparians. 
Downstream riparians often fear that their upstream neighbors will use water as a means of 
coercion. This situation is particularly dangerous if the downstream country believes it has the 
military power to rectify the situation” (Homer-Dixon, 1994, p. 19). On the basis of such 
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criteria, armed conflict is likely to happen in the Nile Basin now or in the future (Whittingon & 
Wu, 2006, p. 3). Other prophecies of the water war scenario over the Nile rely on the fact that 
population volume is projected to more than double by year 2050, coupled with climate change 
issues, could easily end up increasing water and food insecurity in the region (Gebreluel, 2014, 
p. 30).   
According to history, water conflicts between Egypt and Ethiopia have not exceeded 
the level of mutual suspicion, diplomatic tensions and verbal threats (Erlich, 2002 cited in  
Mahmoda, 2003, p. 24). In 1979, President Sadat declared, “the only matter that could take  
Egypt to war again is water” (Gebreluel, 2014, p. 30). Despite the fiery rhetoric and tensions, 
history has also witnessed many cooperation events between Egypt and Ethiopia including the 
Hydromet (1967), the UNUGU (1983), the TECCONILE (1992) and finally the Nile Basin 
Initiative (NBI) (1999).  
As per Yoffe’s water event intensity scale (WEIS) (Figure 2), it can be concluded that 
Egyptian-Ethiopian hydro-political relations have been swinging between point 4 (non-military 
economic, technical or industrial agreements) and point -1 (mild verbal expressions and discord 
in interaction) (Cascão, 2008 cited in Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008, p. 302) or some would 
argue that in some occasions conflicts might have reached point -2 (strong verbal expressions-
hostility in interaction).   
In addition to the long history of cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia, some 
analysts view that Egyptian-Ethiopian water war is irrational due to a number of factors. 
Firstly, if the reason for war is an upstream dam project, the downstream state cannot militarily 
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attack the dam, or else it would flood the downstream lands, as well as, negatively affect the 
quality of the water flowing downstream (Gebreluel, 2014, p. 32). In water conflicts involving 
upstream and downstream states, upsteam states get a power advantage as they can control the 
flow and the pollution of the river than the downstream states (Sjostedt, 2008, p. 232). 
Secondly, Egypt’s current economic plight will not allow it to finance a water war against 
Ethiopia (Milas, 2013 cited in Gebreluel, 2014, p. 31).    
3.3: Conclusion: Cooperation and Conflict Co-exist   
Water issues do not necessarily lead to absolute conflict or absolute cooperation 
(Mirumachi & Allan, 2007). Due to the complexity of water interactions, conflict and 
cooperation co-exist at variable intensities and levels (Ibid).  “Conflict is a concept that is 
independent of co-operation; not always opposite to it. In certain circumstances, conflict may 
be an integral part of inducing and sustaining co-operative behavior, and the two may coexist 
in various social settings” (Craig, 1993 cited in Mirumachi & Allan, 2007, p. 4).   
Craig (1993) argues that conflict and cooperation are not at two opposing ends of a 
continuum, they co-exist at different intensities (cited in Mirumachi & Allan, 2007, p. 4). For 
example, in situations where levels of cooperation are high and conflict are low, relations 
between states become “stable and comfortable” (Ibid). Based on this argument, Craig (1993) 
has developed a tool to interpret different facets of water interactions by plotting high and low 
levels of cooperation and conflict on a 2 x 2 cell matrix.   
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Table 2: Craig’s Matrix  
 
 
  Cooperation      
Low   High   
Conflict   Low   Little interaction    Stable and comfortable   
High   Unstable relations    Unstable, intense, 
sometimes interactive   
Source: Craig, 1993 cited in Mirumachi & Allan, 2007, p. 5   
Transboundary Waters Interaction Nexus (TWINS) Model  
Based on Craig’s (1993) matrix, the TWINS Model also assumes that conflict and 
cooperation co-exist at different intensities and levels (Mirumachi & Zeitoun, 2008, p. 11). In 
other words, it argues that not all cooperation is ‘pretty’ and not all conflicts are ‘violent’ (Ibid,  
p. 9). It considers that transboundary water relations are not static and that they are influenced 
by a number of factors such as power relations, states’ interests and level of trust or distrust 
(Ibid, p. 13). Thus, it divides water interactions into: negative, neutral and positive and plots 
them on a 5 X 4 cell matrix (Ibid, p. 11).  
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Table 3: TWINS Matrix 
Categories of  
Interaction Nexus 
(TWINS)  
Types of Interaction  Examples of  
Interaction   
Influencing Factors   
Low Conflict-High 
Cooperation  
Positive Interaction 
-Equal Cooperation  
-Cooperation on a wide range  
of issues   
-Conflicts are reduced 
through deliberative processes   
-Establishing  
transboundary regimes  
  
-Negotiating water 
treaties based on 
international water law 
e.g. no harm, equitable 
use  
   
-Conclusion of effective 
treaties   
  
  
-Benefit Sharing/Expanding the  
basket of benefits  
  
  
-Reduction of environmental  
uncertainty  
  
  
-Economic/Developmental  
Interests  
  
  
-Issue-Linkage   
  
-Mutual Distrust   
  
-Sharing of resources  
  
-Improvement of international 
reputation  
-Changes in power asymmetries  
-Control of resources   
Low Conflict- 
Medium  
Cooperation  
Neutral Interaction  
-Limited/Token Cooperation  
(on selected issues)  
-Mild verbal expressions of  
Conflict  
-Joint water management; 
Joint  
Infrastructure  
  
-Benefit-sharing  
agreements  
  
-Creation of Basin-wide 
organizations   
Low Conflict-Low  
Cooperation  
Neutral Interaction  
-Minimal or no interaction  
  
-Ad hoc Cooperation; Self-
interested Cooperation; 
Unstable Cooperation  
  
  
-Technical  
meetings/commissions  
  
-Minor exchange of 
information  
Med/High Conflict 
Low Cooperation  
Negative Interaction 
-Coercive/Dominative  
Cooperation  
-Securitized/Violent Conflict   
-Contained or violent 
conflicts  
-Resource Capture  
-Unilateral 
environmentalism   
TWINS matrix is adapted from Mirumachi & Zeitoun, 2008, p. 11. 
Positive interaction occurs when cooperation tends to satisfy the interests of all involved actors 
and leads to sustained inter-state relations (Mirumachi & Zeitoun, 2008, p. 14). It includes both  
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‘broad’ and ‘equitable’ cooperation (Ibid). Broad cooperation means cooperation on a wide 
range of issues that may include non-water related aspects (Ibid). Whereas, equal cooperation 
means that it includes all states on equal terms (Ibid).  
Neutral interaction includes inter-state cooperation that is neither pure nor manipulative, but 
rather medium or minimal cooperation that can range from ad-hoc, self-interested, tactical to 
limited and unstable forms of cooperation (Mirumachi & Zeitoun, 2008, p. 14). Neutral faces 
of conflict can come in form of mild verbal expressions (Ibid).   
Negative interaction includes higher and more escalated levels of conflict that can reach violent 
wars. At this level, inter-state cooperation is either dominative or coercive (Mirumachi & 
Zeitoun, 2008, p. 13).   
3.4: Incentives and Deterrents for Water Cooperation in the Nile Basin   
Throughout the history of water relations between the Nile riparian states, there has 
been a number of incentives and deterrents for the process of cooperation. In the literature of 
transboundary water management, a number of factors has been recurrent in different studies 
that aim to study transboundary water interactions. These factors are: unilateralism, divergent 
interests, asymmetric relations and interdependence.   
Unilateralism   
Unilateralism has been identified as a common behavior in the Nile Basin countries that 
has prevailed throughout their history of cooperation (Waterbury, 1997; Waterbury & 
Whittington, 1998; Erlich, 2002; Swain, 2002; Waterbury, 2002). Each of Egypt and Ethiopia 
has unilaterally developed projects on the Nile in order to promote national interests  
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(Mahmoda, 2003, p. 29). Unilateral behavior in the Nile Basin has been viewed as a direct 
threat to effective cooperation as it weakens the states’ desire to cooperate (Ibid).   
Unilateral behavior can come from either ignorance, habit or convenience and therefore 
there are two types of unilateralism: passive and active (Waterbury, 1997, p. 279). Passive 
unilateralism occurs when a riparian state does nothing or just performs a very minimal action 
towards the shared river (Ibid). Active unilateralism, on the other hand, is when a riparian state 
intentionally executes development projects on the river that impact the quality or the flow of 
the water (Ibid).     
Throughout the history of the Nile, several projects have been unilaterally executed by 
the governments of Egypt and Ethiopia (Mahmoda, 2003, p. 29). In the 1970s, Egypt 
commenced technical studies for its project to transfer the Nile waters to irrigate Israel’s Negev 
desert (Mbaku & Kimenyi, 2015, p. 99). This unilateral action was highly condemned by  
Ethiopia and other Nile riparians as Egypt did not consult with any of them before announcing 
the project (Kendie, 1999, p. 157). In the 1990s, Egypt had started several ambitious 
agricultural projects in the desert including the 1997 Toshka project (Ibid, p. 159). The project 
was estimated to use more than 5 Bm3 of water every year through transferring the waters from 
Lake Nasser to the Toshka depression (Cascão, 2009, p. 249). This action faced opposition 
from many neighboring Nile riparians, especially Ethiopia (Ibid). Ethiopia’s objection to the 
Toshka project was mainly due to the contradiction in Egypt’s Nile policy as the country 
constantly opposed development projects in the upstream part of the Nile, while it was actively 
using the waters for major irrigation projects (Thomson, 2005).  
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In the 1990s, Ethiopia has also commenced feasibility studies for several hydropower 
and irrigation projects on the Nile River (Cascão, 2009, p. 254). Ethiopia wanted to send a 
strong message to the downstream riparians that it would unilaterally embark on its own 
hydraulic missions with or without multilateral negotiations and agreements (Ibid, p.256). The 
conclusion of the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) by the upstream states without 
Egypt’s and Sudan’s consent had marked another unilateral action in the history of the Nile 
Basin hydropolitics (Ibid). Another recent unilateral move by Ethiopia is the construction of the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam which commenced in 2011 without any consultations with 
the downstream states.   
This unilateral trend had hindered the main objectives of the NBI to promote a new 
culture of multilateral cooperation across the Nile Basin (Cascão, 2009, p. 263). It is worth 
noting that Egypt and Ethiopia were moving forward with their unilateral projects while 
simultaneously engaging in multilateral cooperation through the Nile Basin Initiative (Ibid). 
Ethiopia, for example, was very keen to engage in the NBI projects and benefit from the 
financial support offered by the World Bank (Ibid). However, the country knows very well that 
mega hydropower and irrigation projects cannot be implemented multilaterally and may not be 
included in the agenda of NBI projects and therefore they have to be executed unilaterally 
(Ibid).  
On the one hand, these unilateral projects clearly showed that the Nile riparian states 
had not been ready to overcome their "hydro‐sovereignty" strategy (Wouters, 2002 cited in 
Cascão, 2009, p. 263) and that national priorities and interests remained to be the "determinants 
for collective action" (Waterbury, 2002 cited in Cascão, 2009, p. 263). On the other hand, the 
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NBI authorities and external donors had turned a blind eye to the unilateral moves in the basin 
and had not taken any steps towards regulating cooperation between Nile riparians (Cascão, 
2009, p. 263).   
Divergent Interests    
The Nile Basin riparians have different interests and priorities in regard to the Nile 
waters and thus each country has different expectations of a basin-wide cooperation (Mason, 
2004, p. 198). The interests of the Nile Basin states in water cooperation mainly relies on their 
geographical location and economic development (Ibid, p. 168).   
Ethiopia’s interests in the Nile waters stems from its need to utilize the water resources 
for its development and poverty alleviation (Mason, 2004, p. 173). Hydroelectric power 
generation and irrigation are considered to be the main interests of Ethiopia concerning the Nile 
waters (Ibid, p. 169). These interests have been made clear in the 1957 statement by the late 
Emperor Haile Sellassie I (Arsano & Tamrat, 2005, p. 17):   
“We have already explained the plans that are under [way] to utilize our rivers as an essential 
step in the development of agriculture and industry. It is of paramount importance to Ethiopia, 
a problem of first order that the waters of the Nile be made to serve the life and the needs of our 
beloved people now living and those who will follow us in the centuries to come. However, in 
general, Ethiopia may be prepared to share this tremendous God-given wealth of hers with 
friendly neighboring nations, for the life and welfare of their people, it is Ethiopia’s sacred duty 
to develop the great watershed which she possesses in the interests of her own rapidly expanding 
population and economy. To fulfill this task, we have arranged for the problem to be studied in 
all its aspects by experts in the field. Ethiopia has time and again set this forth as her position 
regarding the utilization of the Nile waters”. 
 
Ethiopia puts the issue of reallocating the shares of the Nile waters as a precondition to 
a basin-wide cooperation (Mahmoda, 2003, p. 26). From Ethiopia’s point of view, a basin-wide 
cooperation will only become effective if the 1959 agreement is renegotiated and a new water 
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distribution agreement is formed in order to satisfy the interests of all the Nile basin states 
(Ibid).  
Given that Egypt is the most downstream Nile riparian country, it constantly underlines 
its heavy dependence on the Nile waters and thereby the issue of reallocating the Nile shares is 
a matter of security (Mahmoda, 2003, p. 26). Despite Egypt’s strategy of water security, the 
country has been interested in maintaining goodwill with its neighbors through encouraging 
general cooperation and regional development (Ibid). Accordingly, Egypt’s interest in water 
cooperation is to mainly consolidate its present shares of the waters and to secure more waters 
through information sharing and development projects such as reforestation of the Ethiopian 
highlands and ecological conversation (Ibid).    
The divergent interests of Egypt and Ethiopia from the Nile cooperation were clearly 
declared in the “Country Papers” that were presented in the 5th Nile 2002 Conference in year  
1997 (Erlich, 2002 cited in Mahmoda, 2003, p. 26). Egypt’s official “Country Paper” focused 
on information sharing on local water issues in order to develop basin-wide projects. In the 
same conference, Ethiopia strongly advocated for the need to foster dialogue and 
communication between Nile riparians in order to discuss the issue of the water shares (Ibid).   
Divergent interests of Egypt and Ethiopia do not necessarily lead to conflicts around the 
Nile, but instead this could eventually result in ‘win-win’ trade-offs between the two countries 
(Mason, 2004, p. 198). For example, Egypt could support development projects in Ethiopia, 
and in return Ethiopia commits to securing water flow to Egypt (Ibid).   
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Asymmetric Relationship   
Relationships between co-riparian states are naturally asymmetric (Gleditsch & Marit, 
2012, p. 520). Beginning with geographical asymmetries in upstream/downstream natural 
configuration, in which upstream states get the upper-hand in managing the river affairs since 
they control the origins of the waters (Ibid). Moreover, upstream states get environment-
specific powers (Sjostedt, 2008, p. 232) as activities taken by upstream countries usually affect 
the quality and quantity of the water for the states downstream (Gleditsch & Marit, 2012, p. 
520). When it comes to collaboration on environment-related issues, upstream states get 
decision autonomy (Sjostedt, 2008, p. 232).    
However, there are other scenarios where downstream states have the upper-hand such 
as the case with navigation issues (Sjostedt, 2008, p. 232). In navigation issues, downstream 
states could control the access of upstream states to important harbors and therefore limit their 
trade activities (Ibid). Besides geographical asymmetries, co-riparian states usually have 
asymmetric characteristics. Countries differ in their population growth, GDP per capita, and 
access to natural endowments (Just & Netanyahu, 2012, p. 11)   
Power asymmetry is another integral element of hydro-relations between co-riparian 
states. Powerful states do not necessarily have to be upstream, they could be located upstream, 
middle or even downstream (Daoudy, 2008, p. 363). The basic definition of power is “A’s 
ability to get B to do something that B would not do otherwise” (Dahl (1957) quoted in 
Daoudy, 2008, p. 364). The concept of power has been further developed to incorporate 
different elements. Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner (2006) conceptualized ‘power’ as being 
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based on three dimensions and then the concept had been further modified to incorporate four 
important pillars (Zeitoun & Cascão, 2010, p. 31). Firstly, state’s military, political, economic 
and technological capabilities or what is called structural power (Ibid). Secondly, states’ 
bargaining power or relational power and its ability to control of ‘the rules of the game’ and 
‘set the agenda’ (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006, p. 442). Thirdly, the ideological power through 
which strong states have the knowledge power to trick weaker states into following their self-
serving ideology (Ibid, p. 443). Fourthly, state’s geographical location (Zeitoun & Cascão, 
2010, p. 31) 
Power asymmetry and hegemony are two sides of the same coin. “Power determines 
who the hegemon is” and hegemony allows a better understanding of asymmetric power 
interactions (Zeitoun & Allan, 2008, p. 9). Hegemony can be understood as a mix of force 
‘sticks’ and consent ‘carrots’ (Gramsci, 1935 cited in Zeitoun & Allan, 2008, p. 9). Based on 
the notion of hegemony, the Framework of Hydro-hegemony (FHH) has been conceived 
(Zeitoun & Warner (2006). The concept of Hydro-hegemony is defined by Zeitoun and Warner 
(2006) as:    
“Hegemony at the river basin level, achieved through water resource control strategies 
such as resource capture, integration and containment. The strategies are executed 
through an array of tactics (e.g. Coercion- pressure, treaties, knowledge construction, 
etc.) that are enabled by the exploitation of existing power asymmetries within a weak 
international institutional context”.  
Zeitoun and Warner explained two facets of ‘hydro hegemony’: leadership and 
dominance (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006, p. 439). Leadership or the ‘positive’ form of ‘hydro- 
hegemony’ means managing the stability and order of water affairs to provide an overall 
benefit to both strong and weak states (Ibid). Whereas, the dominant or the ‘negative’ form of 
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‘hydro- hegemony’ occurs when weaker states are denied their rightful shares to water 
resources due to the actions of the more powerful states (Ibid). 
                         Figure 3: Four Pillars of Hydro-Hegemonic Power 
 
                   
 
 
 
                          Source: Zeitoun, M., & Cascão, A. E. (2010). Power, Hegemony and Critical Hydropolitics.   
Zeitoun and Warner applied the framework of hydro-hegemony to the cases of Nile, 
Jordan and Tigris and Euphrates river basins where they concluded that the hydro-hegemons in 
those river basins represent the dominant type of their theory (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006, p. 
437). In the case of the Nile Basin, Egypt has been identified as a dominant hydro-hegemon 
that possessed enough material, bargaining and ideational powers to maintain its position as a 
Nile hegemon for long years (Zeitoun & Cascão, 2010).   
The Nile River Basin has been characterized by a high degree of power asymmetry 
between upstream and downstream states (Cascão, 2009, p. 247). Besides Egypt’s possession 
of strong military power, the country has maintained good relations with world’s greatest 
powers such as the US and the European Union and thus has achieved predominance in terms 
of both economic and bargaining powers in the Nile Basin (Grandi & Hussein, 2017, p. 10). 
Moreover, Egypt has had strong commercial relations with its Nile co-riparians that helped in 
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expanding its political and economic capacities (Ibid). Those commercial relations included 
investments, development projects and aid channeling (Ibid, p.11). The combination of all 
these powers have afforded Egypt a hydro-hegemonic position in the basin. Ethiopia, on the 
other hand, had not been able to exercise its geographic power as an upstream state due to 
many internal issues and divisions that distracted its involvement in any water-related activities 
(Tegegne, 2015, p. 104).  
                          Figure 4: Egypt’s Four Pillars of Power 
 
 
                   
 
 
Source: Zeitoun, M., & Cascão, A. E. (2010). Power, Hegemony and Critical Hydropolitics.    
The hydro-politics of the Nile Basin have significantly changed since the 1990s which 
contributed to balancing power asymmetries between Egypt and Ethiopia (Cascão & Nicol, 
2016, p. 561). The Nile cooperative projects initiated in the 1990s onwards have notably 
increased the ideational and bargaining powers of Ethiopia (Ibid). Ethiopia and upstream states 
have started to possess both human and institutional capacities to manage information, data and 
communication of the Nile affairs. Thus, they have started to play an active role in knowledge 
management, agenda-setting and policy planning (Ibid).    
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In terms of bargaining power, upstream states have succeeded to build strong sub-
alliances among each other to strengthen their bargaining positions vis‐à‐vis the downstream 
riparians (Cascão & Nicol, 2016, p. 562). Ethiopia has started to take the lead and bring issues 
to the table for discussion including the issue of hydraulic development in the upstream 
countries and the long-standing issue of equitable utilization of the Nile waters (Ibid, p. 561). 
The increase of Ethiopia’s bargaining power was most visible in its alliance with the equatorial 
riparian neighbors to unilaterally sign the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) despite 
the reservations of both Egypt and Sudan (Ibid). Ethiopia has also succeeded to build strong 
alliance with Sudan based on a plan of benefits exchange including hydro-power trade and 
sediment control (Ibid).   
As for economic power, China’s involvement in financing the Grand Renaissance Dam 
has had a significant impact on balancing power asymmetries between Egypt and Ethiopia 
(Tegegne, 2015, p. 105). China has provided different equatorial and Eastern Nile Basin 
countries with favorable investment deals which enabled them to move forward with their 
hydraulic development projects (Ibid). More importantly, Ethiopia’s energy development plans 
play a critical role in expanding the country’s economic powers (Grandi & Hussein, 2017, p.  
11). Ethiopia has already signed energy trade agreements with Dijbouti, Kenya and Sudan 
(Ibid). If successful, Ethiopia could easily expand its influence in the Nile Basin by trading 
relatively cheap hydroelectric power in exchange of political alignment (Ibid).    
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                                     Figure 5: Ethiopia’s Four Pillars of Power 
 
 
 
 
 
               Source: Zeitoun, M., & Cascão, A. E. (2010). Power, Hegemony and Critical Hydropolitics.    
The notable development in Ethiopia’s regional influence has been explained as a 
counterhegemonic strategy (Cascão, 2008; Zeitoun & Allan, 2008; Zeitoun & Cascão, 2010; 
Mirumachi et al, 2017). Cascão developed her theory of counter-hegemony on the bases of  
the Framework of Hydro-hegemony of Zeitoun and Warner in order to explain the resistance of 
the non-hegemonic states to dominant hegemons (Hanke, 2013, p. 30). Cascão divides the  
‘counter-hegemony’ strategy into two phases: a) the reactive phase during which non-
hegemons resist and contest the status quo and b) the active phase and that is when non-
hegemons start building an alternative regime (Cascão, 2008 cited in Hanke, 2013, p. 30). As 
far as the Nile Basin is concerned, Ethiopia has contested Egypt’s hegemony through applying 
a number of reactive and active strategies (Cascão, 2008 cited in Tawfik, 2015, p. 5). These 
strategies included: advocating for the principle of ‘equitable utilization’, forming coalitions, 
fund raising for development projects and participating in cooperative initiatives in order to 
challenge the status quo (Ibid).   
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According to Lowi (1993), asymmetric relations in transboundary water settings can 
trigger conflicts only if this is in the interest of the most powerful state (cited in Daoudy, 2008, 
p. 366). Nevertheless, asymmetries could reinforce effective cooperation if influenced or 
challenged (Jagerskog & Zeitoun, 2009, p. 9). Asymmetries can be rendered in a way that 
produces ‘win-win’ or ‘positive-sum’ outcomes to satisfy all pertinent parties (Ibid, p. 12). The 
benefit-sharing model offered by Grey & Sadoff (2002) is one example of influencing 
asymmetries (Ibid). Asymmetries can also be challenged by either leveling the players or the 
playing field (Ibid). Leveling the players can happen by empowering the weaker states ‘non-
hegemons’ and enhancing their technical and bargaining powers (Ibid). As for leveling the 
playing field, this can be done through effective legislative and regulatory water system at the 
sub-national and international levels (Ibid).     
Interdependence   
Interdependence can simply be defined as “situations characterized by reciprocal 
effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (Keohane & Nye, 1977 cited in 
Nye, Jr. & Keohane, 1987, p. 730). In the field of international relations, the notion of 
interdependence between states was firstly introduced from an economic/commercial 
perspective by Richard Cobden in 1850 (Copeland, 1996 cited in Eynon, 2016, p. 4). Based on 
the classical trade theory, trade interdependence allows states to sell the goods they are best at 
in exchange for other goods that they cannot produce (Barbieri, 2002 cited in Nijenhuis, 2012, 
p. 31). Therefore, states become part of an interdependent unit in which violent conflicts are 
unlikely to take place as it would obstruct trade activities and negatively affect states’ income 
(Ibid).   
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In his theory of neo-functionalism, Ernst Haas was the first to introduce the link 
between economic interdependence and political integration in his analysis of the European 
Community (Haas, 1958). According to Haas’s theory, economic interdependence between 
states promotes further political integration among them (Ibid). Following in Haas’s work, 
Keohane and Nye broadened the concept of interdependence to include other linkages between 
states and developed the concept of Complex Interdependence (Eynon, 2016, p. 5). Keohane 
and Nye defined the concept of complex interdependence as “a situation among a number of 
countries in which multiple channels of contact connect societies; there is no hierarchy of 
issues; and military force is not used by governments towards one another” (Nye, Jr. & 
Keohane, 1987, p. 731).   
     Keohane and Nye positioned their theory of Complex Interdependence as an “ideal type 
of international system” that involve “joint gains or joint losses between the parties involved” 
(Keohane & Nye, 1977 cited in Eynon, 2016, p. 5). The theory is not only limited to situations 
of balanced independence, but also extends to asymmetries of dependences between states as 
well (Eynon, 2016, p. 10). The theory assumes that asymmetric dependences can be used a 
source of power by the weaker states (Ibid). Keohane and Nye introduced two dimensions of 
interdependence: sensitivity and vulnerability (Keohane & Nye, 1977 cited in Rana, 2015, p. 
294). Sensitivity means the extent to which states are sensitive to external changes (Ibid). More 
sensitive states would incur more costs to control changes than the other states (Ibid). As for 
vulnerability, it means the degree to which states can control their responsiveness to the 
sensitivity (Ibid). The less vulnerable state does not necessarily have to be less sensitive, 
however, it means that it would suffer less from altering policies or changing events (Ibid). 
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International river basins naturally create an inevitable network of complex 
interdependencies among riparian states (Elhance, 1999, p. 13). This complex network includes 
political, economic, environmental and security interdependencies (Ibid). Multiple water uses 
and benefits, threats of resource scarcity and population growth are all factors that create 
economic interdependence among co-riparian states (Nijenhuis, 2012, pp. 33-35). Co-riparian 
states are also bound by basin-wide institutions, water treaties and international law which 
establish political interdependencies among them (Ibid). As for environmental interdependence, 
it comes from rising global warming issues and its threat to water availability (Ibid).    
Interdependence between co-riparian states is viewed as a source of either conflict or 
cooperation. Wolf et al (2006, p. 1) argue that interdependence prevent conflicts between 
states, “water fuels greater interdependence. By coming together to jointly manage their 
shared water resources, countries can build trust and prevent conflict”. Wolf et al based this 
interdependence-cooperation argument on the findings of the BAR (Basins at Risk) study that 
presented historical evidence of cooperative events among interdependent co-riparian states 
that outweighed conflictual ones (Wolf et al, 2006, p. 3). Wu et al (2013, p. 90), on the other 
hand, argue that overestimation of the interdependencies, among co-riparian states can 
adversely affect cooperation for many reasons. One problem is that overestimated 
interdependence can create anxiety among co-riparians regarding their expectations of 
cooperation and thus hamper any further process of integration (Ibid). Another problem is that 
overestimation of interdependencies may distract states from proceeding with important and 
simple water development projects due to perceived advantages from other interdependent 
projects (Ibid).   
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With regards to the Egyptian-Ethiopian hydro-relations, a water war scenario is highly 
unlikely in the complex interdependent world that Keohane and Nye put forward. As assumed 
by the complex interdependence theory, security is not achieved by military force, but rather 
with possible means of cooperation (Eynon, 2016, p. 23). In this regard, the issue of the GERD 
is not likely to create a military conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia as it would produce 
unbearable consequences for the two parties (Ibid, p. 24). Therefore, “the influence deriving 
from favorable asymmetries in sensitivity is very limited when the underlying asymmetries in 
vulnerability are unfavorable” (Ibid). With the rise of new security threats such as climate 
change, consideration of the interdependent characteristic of the issue would be the rational 
solution as the survival of one state becomes dependent of the survival of the other states (Ibid, 
p. 22). As Whittington argues, “cooperation is viable because adaptation to climate change is 
likely to be expensive, and more importantly, the risks are highly tangibly detrimental” 
(Whittington et al, 2014, p. 605).    
Besides the natural interdependence between Egypt and Ethiopia as two riparian states 
sharing the Nile, it is argued that Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) with all its programs and projects 
has increased the overall level of interdependence among the Nile riparians (Kaasa, 2015, p. 
40). One of the key characteristics of Complex Interdependence is multiple channels of contact 
which refers to the effect of transnational relations on increasing sensitivity of states to one 
another (Keohane & Nye, 1972 cited in Eynon, 2016, p. 18). Therefore, the NBI has opened 
opportunities for dialogue, communication and investments, and thus increased the degree of 
interdependence among the Nile riparians (Ibid, p. 49).    
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As for economic interdependence, it is argued that trade relations decrease during the 
times of tension (Copeland, 2002 cited in Eynon, 2016, p. 18) and the announcement of the 
GERD project in 2011 had indeed disrupted trade relations between Egypt and Ethiopia 
(Eynon, 2016, p. 18). However, this tension has not lasted for so long and old trade ties have 
been incrementally restored between the two countries since 2013 (Ibid). Several trade and 
investment agreements have been signed between Egypt and Ethiopia including twenty 
bilateral deals on education, health and trade (BBC, 2014). Also, three Egyptian projects worth 
$50 million were announced to be established in Ethiopia’s first industrial zone (Daily News 
Egypt, 2013 cited in Eynon, 2016, p. 19).    
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Chapter 4: Conceptual Framework   
Based on the review of the literature, this research study nullifies the likelihood of a 
water war scenario to break out between Egypt and Ethiopia. Conversely, it adopts the conflict-
cooperation co-existence notion and argues for further cooperative relations between the two 
countries on and beyond the Nile River based on a number of factors. First and foremost, 
history proves that the number of international water treaties and cooperative events 
outweighed the conflictual ones even between the bitterest enemies. In the context of the Nile 
Basin, Egypt and Ethiopia have never fought a violent war over water issues. Using 
Mirumachi’s TWINS model, the Egyptian-Ethiopian water relations fall into the neutral-
interaction category. In other words, the water relations between two countries has been 
swinging between low conflict and low/medium cooperation. The two countries have been 
engaged in common cooperative initiatives, yet they have not reached a robust cooperation 
model. This does therefore not mean the complete absence of conflict, but simply how water 
conflicts between Egypt and Ethiopia have never escalated beyond the level of threats and 
counter-threats.  
Secondly, the idea of an upstream-downstream water war is strategically irrational 
(Gebreluel, 2014, p. 32). If the reason for war is a dam project in the upstream state and the 
downstream is militarily capable of attacking the project site, any violent action towards the 
dam would result in mutual destruction (Ibid). Attacking an upstream dam would flood parts of 
downstream countries and could easily provoke the upstream state to strike retaliatory actions 
by polluting the waters, and ending up with a severe lose-lose situation (Ibid).    
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Thirdly, the balance of powers between Egypt and Ethiopia makes a water war a less 
likely scenario. One the one hand, Ethiopia is geographically more powerful than Egypt due to 
its position upstream. On the other hand, Egypt is militarily stronger than Ethiopia. This 
balance of powers makes Egypt and Ethiopia very vulnerable to each other’s actions. Thus, 
violent conflicts become unfavorable as the two countries’ asymmetries in vulnerability are 
similar (Eynon, 2016, p. 24). Fourthly, the multifunctional nature of the water and the complex 
interdependent characteristics of transboundary river basins open the door to cooperation 
opportunities through forming the right linkages between various water and non-water issues.  
Hence, this research analyzes possible cooperation opportunities between Egypt and 
Ethiopia using the benefit-sharing framework. The concept of benefit sharing is defined as “any 
action designed to change the allocation of costs and benefits associated with cooperation”  
(Sadoff & Grey, 2005, p. 422). In other words, it suggests an integrative ‘positive-sum’ 
approach (Wolf, 2004, p. 18) through exploiting different hydrological interdependencies in 
order to derive potential benefits whether social, economic, political or environmental. It also 
offers a positive and pragmatic approach of negotiating between riparian states by tying issues 
of water to other non-water aspects such as energy exports, raw materials and manufactured 
goods. As discussed by Woodhouse and Phillips (2009, p. 101), “negotiating on a project by 
project can easily result in a stalemate-whereas the basket of benefits approach means 
opportunities can be modified and changed until an acceptable outcome is agreed by all”. 
  Thus, an integral feature of the benefit-sharing model is issue linkage or broadening the 
basket of mutual benefits. In the international cooperation literature, issue linkage theory is 
simply a bargaining tool which is defined as “linkage between unrelated or only loosely-
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related issues in order to gain increased leverage in negotiation” (Wallace, 1976 cited in 
Poast, 2013, p. 287). In other words, it simply means linking water and non-water issues in 
order to create ‘bigger baskets’ of benefits that can be achieved by all involved parties 
(Tollison and Willett, 1979 cited in Daoudy, 2008, p. 367).  Such linkages broaden the 
countries’ ranges of options and open the door to multiple constructive solutions or what’s 
called ‘the package deal’ (Mostert, 1998, p. 209).   
Issue linkage has two main objectives (Poast, 2013, p. 287). First objective is to 
encourage states to reach an agreement by generating benefits from cooperation (Ibid). Second 
objective is to incentivize states to stay committed to the negotiated agreements (Ibid).  
Therefore, issue linkages expand the pie by introducing bigger baskets of benefits and trade-
offs and in turn, this facilitates a viable benefit-sharing deal to be conceived. Wolf et al (1999) 
studied 145 successful water treaties in which issue-linkages were very common (Gupta, 2016, 
P. 107). Wolf et al found that 30 percent of those treaties included monetary linkages, one 
percent included political linkages, 4 percent had land linkages and 7 percent had other types of 
linkages (Ibid).  
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  Source: The author, modified from (Sadoff & Grey, 2005, p. 421).    
As discussed in the earlier chapters, there are four types of benefit sharing: (1) benefits 
to the river, (2) benefits from the river, (3) reduction of costs because of the river and (4) 
benefits beyond the river (Sadoff & Grey, 2005, p. 421). Given the current controversy over the 
GERD, chapter five analyzes the potential benefits from the river that can be generated from 
this project. In an attempt to broaden the basket of benefits, chapter six looks into potential 
benefits beyond the river which refers to possible issue linkages between the Nile water issues 
and other non-water cooperation opportunities such as trade deals and joint investments.  
Benefit-sharing is an incremental process that has three phases: short, medium, and 
long-term (Tafesse, 2009, p. 239). Short-term phase is strengthening ties between co-riparian 
states through establishing different cooperative initiatives and maintaining continuous 
dialogue (Ibid). Medium-term phase is about setting benefit-cost sharing plan (Ibid). Finally, 
the long-term phase is establishing joint development projects to potentially create positive 
Figure 6: Conceptual Framework 
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outcomes to all co-riparians (Ibid). In the case of the Nile Basin, there have been important 
steps taken in the short-term phase that will be thoroughly discussed in chapter four. 
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Chapter 5: The Benefit Sharing Framework in the Nile Basin Initiative  
The Benefit-Sharing model is not new in the context of the Nile Basin. There have been 
earlier attempts to incorporate this model into the operations administered by the NBI at the 
basin and sub-basin level. Hence, this chapter aims to further analyze the Nile Basin experience 
with the Benefit-Sharing Framework. It tries to specifically answer the following questions: 
What was achieved? And What went wrong? Both Egypt and Ethiopia were active members in 
the NBI during the benefit-sharing workshops which took place between years 2008 and 2009 in 
which they have listed their envisioned benefits from the Nile River. In addition, Egypt, Ethiopia 
and Sudan have been part of the Joint Multipurpose Program (JMP) of the Eastern Nile Sub-
basin that aimed to promote benefit-sharing projects between the three countries. Thus, this 
analysis facilitates the understanding of the applicability of the benefit-sharing model as a 
cooperative tool to foster sustainable and effective cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia and 
avoid future conflicts.  
5.1: The NBI Benefit-Sharing Framework 
The main vision of establishing the Nile Basin Initiative is “to achieve sustainable socio-
economic development through equitable utilization of and benefit from, the common Nile Basin 
water resources” (NBI, 2017). This vision aims at achieving an overall development at various 
scales and levels such as poverty alleviation, optimal use of the water and economic cooperation 
to seek win-win gains for all member states (Bhargava, 2012).  
The benefit-sharing model has been thoroughly studied and reviewed under the auspices 
of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) to serve as a cooperative tool to unlock more value from the 
basin and resolve disagreements between upstream and downstream states with an overall 
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positive outcome (NBI, 2014, p. 10). Therefore, the NBI defines benefit-sharing as “cooperation 
between states to increase the benefits in a transboundary basin and to fairly distribute the 
benefits in support of local, national and regional development objectives” (Ibid). Another 
definition of the NBI benefit sharing framework is “a mechanism to identify new benefit sharing 
scenarios in the context of increasing cooperation. In turn those forms of cooperation would 
reduce the possibility of conflict and provide an alternative perspective for cooperative and 
beneficial water sharing” (NBI, 2009, p. 8). According to the latter definition, the NBI Benefit 
Sharing Framework aims at optimizing water use across different sectors and countries (Ibid, p. 
6) and avoiding conflicts. 
In one of the NBI reports, the benefit-sharing model has been conceptually explained 
showing how upstream and downstream countries could collaborate to optimize water use in one 
sector in order to produce higher return value in other sectors and thus increase the overall 
benefits to all countries involved (NBI, 2009). Therefore, the NBI hypothetically explains the 
benefit-sharing model as following: 
Scenario One:  
Country A (upstream) and Country B (downstream) share 100 km3of water flow (Q) per 
year (NBI, 2009, p. 7). Based on an agreement, Country A gets a share of 80 km3 and Country B 
gets 20 km3 (Ibid). On the one hand, Country A has more efficient industry, but an average 
agriculture (Ibid). On the other hand, Country B has more efficient growth in the agricultural 
sector, yet it does not possess enough capacities for developing its industrial sector (Ibid). Based 
 67 
 
on the aforementioned, the two countries generate a combined economic return (P) of a total US 
$115 million (Ibid). 
Consumption/Sector Country A (Upstream) Country B (Downstream) 
 Volume (km3) Economic Return ($M) Volume (km3) Economic Return ($M) 
Agriculture 60 60 12 30 
Industry 5 25 0 0 
Domestic Consumption 15 0 8 0 
Total 80 85 20 30 
Combined Total Total Volume= 100 Km3, Total Economic Returns= 115 $M 
 
Scenario Two: 
Country B is not satisfied with the present water allocation plan and thus requests to 
redistribute the shares of the water, so that it could build its infrastructure (NBI, 2009, p. 7). 
After negotiations, Country B now gets a share of 25 km3 and Country A gets 75 Km3 (Ibid). 
However, the total economic returns of the two countries falls to US $105 million (Ibid). 
Consumption/Sector Country A (Upstream) Country B (Downstream) 
 Volume (km3) Economic Return ($M) Volume (km3) Economic Return ($M) 
Agriculture 60 60 12 30 
Industry 3 15 0 0 
Domestic Consumption 12 0 13 0 
Total 75 75 25 30 
Combined Total Total Volume= 100 Km3, Total Economic Returns= 105 $M 
 
Scenario Three: 
To make up for that economic loss, Country A decided to spend $5 million to enhance its 
water use efficiency which results in increasing the water flow to Country B with an additional 5 
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km3 per year (NBI, 2009, p. 7). The extra 5km3 helps Country B to improve its agricultural 
sector and therefore it agrees to return the $5 million to Country A (Ibid). 
Consumption/Sector Country A (Upstream) Country B (Downstream) 
 Volume (km3) Economic Return ($M) Volume (km3) Economic Return ($M) 
Agriculture 60 60 12 30 
Industry 3 15 0 0 
Domestic Consumption 12 0 13 0 
Total 75 75 25+5 from A 30-5 to A 
Combined Total Total Volume= 100 Km3, Total Economic Returns= 105 $M 
 
Scenario Four: 
Despite the improved cooperative relations between Countries A & B, the net economic 
return is still the same value without any further increase (NBI, 2009, P. 7). Country A notices 
that its economic return from agriculture is still low in comparison with Country B which is 
much more advanced in this sector (Ibid). The two countries agree that instead of B returning 
$5M (investment debt) per year to A, B will provide A with the know-how to improve its 
agriculture (Ibid). As a result, Country A increases its economic return from agriculture with $5 
million each year and agrees to increase the water flow to Country B by an additional 5 Km3 
(Ibid). 
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Consumption/Sector Country A (Upstream) Country B (Downstream) 
 Volume (km3) Economic Return ($M) Volume (km3) Economic Return ($M) 
Agriculture 60 65 17 30 
Industry 3 15 0 0 
Domestic Consumption 12 0 13 0 
Total 75 75 25+10 from A 30-5 invested in 
training A 
Combined Total Total Volume= 100 Km3, Total Economic Returns= 110 $M 
 
Scenario Five: 
Despite the economic progress achieved in both countries, it is not as beneficial as 
scenario A (NBI, 2009, p. 8). Due to the interest in both countries in achieving win-win 
outcomes, A & B agree to evenly divide their water shares, so that each country gets a share of 
50 km3 per year (Ibid). This agreement is contingent on a continuous improvement in the 
agriculture sector (Ibid). Country A also decided to allocate an extra 2 km3 from its share to its 
industrial sector (Ibid). 
Consumption/Sector Country A (Upstream) Country B (Downstream) 
 Volume (km3) Economic Return ($M) Volume (km3) Economic Return ($M) 
Agriculture 33 55 37 60 
Industry 5 25 0 0 
Domestic Consumption 12 0 13 0 
Total 50 50 25+10 from A 30-5 invested in 
training A 
Combined Total Total Volume= 100 Km3, Total Economic Returns= 140 $M 
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Scenario Six: 
Countries A & B notice the overall economic progress and thus decide to continue in this 
positive-sum direction (NBI, 2009, p. 8). This time, they decide to invest more in their industrial 
sector (Ibid). Since Country A is more developed industrially than Country B, the latter decided 
to get some assistance from A in this sector (Ibid). The two countries also decide to reallocate the 
shares of the water, so that A gets 60 km3 per year and B gets 40 Km3 per year (Ibid).  
Consumption/Sector Country A (Upstream) Country B (Downstream) 
 Volume (km3) Economic Return ($M) Volume (km3) Economic Return ($M) 
Agriculture 40 60 20 50 
Industry 8 40 7 35 
Domestic Consumption 12 0 13 0 
Total 60 100 40 85 
Combined Total Total Volume= 100 Km3, Total Economic Returns= 185 $M 
 
Scenario 6 is seen as a perfect model for a win-win outcome ((NBI, 2009, p. 8). In 
Scenario 1, Country A got a share of 80 Km3/year and made an economic outcome of $85M/year 
(Ibid). After cooperation with Country B, it now gets a share of 60 km3/year and makes an 
annual economic return of $10M (Ibid). Also, Country B used to get a share of 20 km3/year and 
made an annual economic return of $30km3 and now it gets a share of 40 km3 and makes an 
annual economic return of $85M/year (Ibid). 
In these hypothetical scenarios, the NBI aimed to simply explain how cooperation could 
generate a wide array of shared benefits if countries agree to change their water sharing 
perceptions (NBI, 2009, P. 8). The model also shows that the benefit-sharing model is achievable 
if countries agree to cooperate and if there are new opportunities that they can jointly optimize 
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(Ibid). Therefore, the benefit-sharing model is a mechanism to unlock new opportunities of 
benefit-sharing in the context of stable and sustainable cooperation (Ibid). As a result, the 
possibility of conflict will be reduced and the rate of interstate cooperation will be increased 
(Ibid). 
 5.2: Main Achievements  
The Shared Vision Program (SVP) and the Subsidiary Action Programs (SAP) 
The Nile Basin Initiative includes two complementary programs: the all-basin Shared 
Vision Program (SVP) and the sub-basin Subsidiary Action Programs (SAP) (Hamed & Ahmed, 
2014, p. 3). The Shared Vision Program (SVP) mainly focuses on reinforcing trust and 
confidence among the Nile Basin countries (Ibid). Whereas, the Subsidiary Action Programs 
(SAP) aims to promote investments and economic development at sub-basin levels (Ibid).  
The SAP has two main programs which are managed by two sub-basin offices (Hamed & 
Ahmed, 2014, p. 3). In the Eastern Nile region, the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office 
(ENTRO) is responsible for the Eastern Nile River Basin Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP) 
(Ibid). In the Nile Equatorial Lakes region, the Nile Equatorial Lakes Coordination Unit 
(NELSAP-CU) manages the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP) (Ibid, 
p. 4). 
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The Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO) and the Joint Multipurpose Program 
(JMP) 
  ENTRO is located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and is responsible for managing projects for 
water resource development in the Eastern Nile region by assisting Egypt, Ethiopia, South 
Sudan, and Sudan to initiate development projects and investments at a regional/transboundary 
level (Hamed & Ahmed, 2014, p. 31).  
The ENTRO has developed a number of investment projects including the Joint 
Multipurpose Program (JMP) (Hamed & Ahmed, 2014, p. 42). The objective of the JMP is to 
develop multiple economic integration projects between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan that go 
beyond the river (Tafesse, 2009, p. 241). The JMP plan includes four main elements: (a) 
watershed and environmental management, (b) increasing agricultural productivity, (c) building 
power systems and (d) sustaining growth and cooperation (Ibid). 
In 2006, the ENTRO office developed the One System Inventory (OSI) in order to 
support the Joint Multipurpose Program (JMP) of the NBI (Hamed & Ahmed, 2014, p. 4). The 
main objective of the OSI was to serve as a regional knowledge hub across Egypt, Ethiopia and 
Sudan that aimed to assess the Nile Basin resources and development opportunities (Ibid). It 
primarily focused on water resources, socio-economy and environmental issues of the region 
(Ibid). 
The JMP launched the first phase of its projects (JMP1) that included ‘Anchor Projects’ 
and ‘Ancillary Projects’ (World Bank, 2013, p. 10). The Anchor Projects included plans for 
constructing a large dam for hydroelectric power generation and other joint multipurpose water 
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development projects such as watershed and agricultural management (Ibid). Whereas, the 
Ancillary Projects focused on areas of transport and navigation (Ibid). In 2009, The JMP1 
Identification (ID) studies were designed to support the Eastern Nile (EN) countries (Egypt, 
Ethiopia and Sudan) to identify the first package of the JMP1 major investments through a series 
of research and consultations (Ibid). Despite the promising steps taken by the JMP1, the progress 
of the project was interrupted and eventually closed in December 2012 for a number of reasons 
(Seide, 2014, p. 2): 
(1) One key reason was the disagreements over the Cooperative Framework Agreement 
(CFA) in mid-2010 between the three EN countries which led to a ‘freeze’ in the 
participation of Egypt and Sudan in the whole Nile Basin Initiative including the 
JMP1 (World Bank, 2013, p. 11). Researchers and consultants were not able to travel 
to some EN countries and therefore all data gathering and information collection 
activities were halted (Ibid, p. 23).  
(2) In addition, the announcement of the unilateral construction of the Grand Renaissance 
Dam on the Blue Nile outside the JMP1 process complicated the hydro political 
situation between the three EN countries (World Bank, 2013, p. 11). 
(3) Another reason was related to the quality issues of the technical studies (World Bank, 
2013, p. 23). The JMP1 ID studies were originally designed with a high level of 
complexity that created long-term issues with its implementation (Ibid). Moreover, 
the supervision process was not of a high standard to allow satisfactory results (Ibid). 
(4) Institutional and Managerial issues were also factors to the JMP1 stagnation (World 
Bank, 2013, p. 25). Due to the hydro-political turmoil between the three EN countries 
and the freeze in participation of Egypt and Sudan, the progress of the project was 
negatively affected by the reduction of the high-level technical and managerial 
capacities (Ibid). Due to the tensions that arose between the three EN countries, two 
managers who were directly involved in the JMP1 ID studies resigned from ENTRO 
and were not replaced (Ibid). Additionally, some core staff positions such as the 
Economist and the Finance Specialist remained unfilled as high calibers were 
discouraged to apply due to the political uncertainty that surrounded ENTRO from 
2010 onwards (Ibid). 
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The Socio-economic Development and Benefit Sharing (SDBS) and the NBI Benefit-Sharing 
Framework (BSF) 
Among several projects concluded under the Shared Vision Programs (SVP) of the NBI, 
the Socio-economic Development and Benefit Sharing (SDBS) Project has emerged as the NBI’s 
second strategy in year 2005 at the level of the basin (Mekonnen, 2011, p. 358). The SDBS 
project was designed as a part of the NBI benefit-sharing strategy. It mainly aimed at (1) 
developing a network of private and public sectors, technical experts, academicians, and NGOs 
representatives from across the Nile basin, (2) identifying possible opportunities for socio-
economic development and benefit-sharing, (3) building national and regional capacities for 
policy making and macro-economic analysis and (4) developing criteria and methods for sharing 
the benefits and costs of basin-wide cooperation along with risk management plan (Seide, 2014, 
p. 5). 
The SDBS consists of three stages: (1) establishing a common understanding, (2) 
building scope and significance of benefit sharing scenarios and (3) determining magnitude of 
baskets of benefits (NBI, 2009, p. 11). Stage one was mainly a planning phase during which the 
Nile riparians could discuss what they expect from the benefit sharing framework and how they 
plan to apply it (Ibid). Some of the main points that needed to be discussed in stage one is 
whether the framework will be applied to the whole river basin or to separate sub basins, what 
types of benefits are to be included in the agreement (e.g. trade) and if the agreement only 
includes Blue water6 or it extends to other types such as Green water7, groundwater or virtual 
water8 (Ibid). Stage two is setting a broad range of benefit sharing scenarios and identifying 
                                                 
6  Blue Water refers to both surface water and groundwater  
7  Green Water is the water that comes from the rain and is stored in the soil  
8  Virtual Water is the water embodied in products such as agricultural products 
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potential “baskets of benefits”. Stage two is just qualitative and does not involve accurate 
calculation of the benefits. Stage three of the framework is to create a quantitative analysis for 
the determined shared benefits. 
Transboundary Water Opportunity (TWO) Analysis 
As part of the World Bank’s plan to employ the benefit-sharing model in the Nile system, 
the TWO Analysis tool was developed to explore all existing and potential development 
opportunities ‘the basket of benefits’ that can be generated from transboundary water resources 
to produce positive-sum outcomes ( Phillips et al, 2009, p. 2). This tool is not only confined to 
Blue Water as it also applies to Green Water, Virtual Water and all forms of reusable water (Ibid, 
p. 4). In early 2009, thirty-five representatives from all the Nile Basin countries attended a three-
day workshop to work on the TWO matrix (Ibid, p. 19). In the TWO analysis workshop, the Nile 
Basin countries discussed potential development opportunities within the following categories:  
 
 Hydropower and power trading: Electrical power is one the most important indicators 
for a healthy economic growth, however, there are many hydropower resources that have 
not been explored yet especially in developing countries (Phillips et al, 2009, p. 9). 
Despite the great economic value of hydropower, the development of hydropower 
projects might produce critical effects on the river balance within a transboundary basin 
(Ibid). Thus, the positive economic benefits of hydropower development should be 
weighed against the potential negative effects of dams on co-riparian states (Ibid). The 
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location of the dams on transboundary rivers is one important factor that should be agreed 
upon by all co-riparians (Ibid).  
 Primary production: This refers to the potential benefits that can be attained in the 
agricultural sector by improving water techniques (Phillips et al, 2009, p. 9). The 
agricultural sector is considered to be one of the most important contributors to economic 
development in many states especially in Africa (Ibid). In Africa, huge volumes of water 
are wasted due to the mismanagement of the irrigation techniques (Ibid).  
 Urban growth and industrial development: Fresh water allocated to the industrial and 
services sectors can generate higher economic returns than that of the agricultural sector 
(Phillips et al, 2009, p. 10). However, it is important for countries to carefully select the 
right industries that can accelerate their economic growth (Ibid). 
 Environment and ecosystem services: the TWO model gave a special emphasis on the 
fisheries and tourism in this sector, however, there is a wide range of other services that 
can produce high positive returns as well such as food, biochemical products and climate 
regulation (Phillips et al, 2009, p. 10). 
TWO Analysis Matrix 
The final shape of TWO Analysis Matrix is an optional decided by the riparian states 
themselves (Phillips et al, 2009, p. 19). Riparian states may add or remove to the original 
development categories (the right vertical column in the matrix) (Ibid). This contends the fact 
that each transboundary basin has unique characteristics and accordingly each has a different mix 
of development categories (Ibid) 
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In the TWO matrix, riparian states answer certain questions related to the selected 
possibilities for benefit-sharing and rate the importance of each selection using the color coding 
shown below (Phillips et al, 2009, p. 25). 
                                                                                    Important 
                                                                                    Positive 
                                                                                    Some Link 
                                                                                    Insignificant 
Table 4:  The TWO Model  
Questions:                                                                    
Development 
Opportunity 
Sub-category  New Water 
(NW) 
Efficient Use of 
Water (EUW) 
Virtual Water 
(VW) 
Hydropower Construction of 
Dam X  
Can Dam X create 
NW? 
Can Dam X allow 
more EUW? 
Can Dam X affect 
VW flows? 
Construction of 
Dam X  
Can NW affect 
Dam X 
Construction? 
Can the EUW affect 
Dam X 
construction? 
Can VW flows 
affect Dam X 
construction? 
Primary 
Production 
(Agricultural 
benefits) 
Crop yields  Can changes in crop 
yield create NW? 
Can changes in crop 
field affect the 
EUW? 
Can changes in crop 
yield affect VW 
flows? 
Crop yields Can NW enhance 
crop yields? 
Can the EUW 
enhance crop 
yields? 
Can VW flows 
affect crop yields? 
Urban 
Growth/Industrial 
Development  
Growth of the 
mining sector  
Can mining growth 
create NW? 
Can mining growth 
affect the EUW? 
Can mining growth 
affect VW flows? 
Growth of the 
mining sector   
Can NW enhance 
mining growth 
Can the EUW 
enhance mining 
growth? 
Can VW flows 
affect mining 
growth? 
Environment and 
Ecosystem 
Services  
Tourism  Can increased 
tourism create NW? 
Can increased 
tourism affect the 
EUW? 
Can increased 
tourism affect VW 
flows? 
Tourism  Can NW increase 
tourism? 
Can the EUW 
increase tourism? 
Can VW flows 
increase tourism? 
Source: TWO Analysis Matrix copied from (Phillips et al, 2009, p. 11) 
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Stages of the TWO Analysis Exercise (Phillips et al, 2009, p. 16) 
  
                                                   
                                   
 
 
      
 
 
  
 
 
During the same period of the TWO analysis workshop, the Nile riparians were very 
much occupied with their discussions on the draft of the Cooperative Framework Agreement 
(CFA) (Ibid, p. 20). Despite their disagreements over the CFA, the Nile riparians smoothly 
collaborated on finalizing the TWO Analysis matrix (Ibid). In the exercise, the Nile riparians 
agreed upon several issues that can be summarized as following: 
 Enhancing the flows of the Blue Water within the Nile Basin through a better 
management of the Green Water-Blue Water interface in the upper parts of the White 
Nile and the Blue Nile where there is frequent rainfall (Woodhouse et al, 2017, p. 236).   
Stage One: Creation of the TWO Analysis 
Matrix 
Stage Two: Qualitative Analysis of the potential 
benefits from shared water resources 
Stage Three: Quantitative Analysis of the 
selected benefits  
Stage Four: Creation of Benefit Portfolios that 
include cost-benefit analysis, rate of return data 
and Positive Sum Outcomes  
Stage Five: Political Considerations and 
decisions 
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 Improving the use of fresh water in agriculture in all the Nile riparian states. Inefficient 
irrigation has resulted in low agricultural yields in the whole Nile Basin (Woodhouse et 
al, 2017, p. 236).   
 Giving attention to the Virtual Water flows, through a well-managed pattern of import 
and export of traded products between Nile riparians. This largely depends on the overall 
improvement of the agricultural sectors in the Nile Basin (Woodhouse et al, 2017, p. 
236).   
 Developing the industrial sector across the Nile Basin countries, especially those 
industries that rely on the primary ores that are abundant in the riparians involved. 
Allocating water to the industry sector brings higher economic returns, compared to the 
use of allocating the same volumes of water to the agricultural sector (Woodhouse et al, 
2017, p. 236).   
 Promoting high-end tourism (including ecotourism) which can generate high economic 
returns in many Nile riparian states (Woodhouse et al, 2017, p. 236).   
5.3: Main Challenges  
Mekonnen (2010, p. 249) argued, “in as much as sharing transboundary waters is 
difficult, designing the appropriate modality in which benefit-sharing would be carried out is as 
difficult and perplexing”. Although the NBI benefit-sharing model has achieved significant 
strides theoretically, the operationalization of this model still remains a big challenge 
(Haileslassie et al, 2008, p. 66). 
Several studies have been conducted to identify the key reasons behind the stagnation of 
the benefit-sharing and socio-economic development in the Nile Basin. Among these studies, 
Okbazghi and Keren Yohannes (2012) argue that one of the main reasons is the Nile riparians’ 
preoccupation with supply augmentation strategies rather than strategies for demand 
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management diversifications. Therefore, the Nile riparians states have unilaterally planned for 
mega water projects on the Nile which have signaled weak faith among ‘benefit sharing’ 
negotiators (Ibid).  
Another important factor identified was the mismanagement of foreign funding which 
was mostly spent on symbolic and pilot projects (Yohannes & Yohannes, 2012, p. 204). The 
operationalization of the NBI benefit-sharing model mainly depended on foreign assistance from 
the international organizations and donor governments (Ibid). Although an externally-driven 
transboundary cooperation has proven to support internal resource capacity, but it still could not 
completely substitute it (Ibid, p. 205). Confidence-building and trust needs to reinforced by the 
Nile basin countries themselves in order to achieve a sustainable benefit-sharing model (Ibid).  
The inadequate capacity for policy analysis has been another key issue to the benefit-
sharing implementation in the Nile Basin (NILE-SEC, 2001, p. 5). Many Nile Basin states lacked 
the requisite skills to conduct research studies and assessments to the different scenarios of 
investments and their projected outcomes (Ibid). Therefore, the uneven capacities of policy 
analysis across the Nile Basin made it difficult to reach well-informed discussions and conclude 
mutual agreements (Ibid). This will not happen except if representatives of each country are 
well-trained to communicate with each other in the technical language that all groups understand 
(Ibid).  
In 2009, Cascão conducted interviews with a number of national and regional 
stakeholders including experts and consultants who were directly involved in the Nile Basin 
benefit-sharing project (Cascão et al, 2009, p. 65). The interviews were an attempt to identify the 
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main challenges faced in implementing the benefit-sharing model (Ibid). The outcome of the 
interviews revealed that several NBI stakeholders considered the benefit-sharing model as a 
complex and opaque (Ibid). They looked at it as a ‘purely’ theoretical concept that is difficult to 
be realized in real life (Ibid). Cascão summarized the findings of her interviews in the following 
points: 
1) Key decision-makers found it difficult to identify the range of benefits that could be generated 
from the model to be traded among the NBI countries (Cascão et al, 2009, p. 65). 
2) Due to the absence of joint investment projects between the Nile riparian states, it was 
challenging to identify the possible costs and benefits from the application of the model (Cascão 
et al, 2009, p. 65). 
3) It was also difficult to visualize the benefit- and cost-sharing at a basin-wide (multilateral 
level) (Cascão et al, 2009, p. 65). 
4) Some upstream riparians were concerned that the benefit-sharing approach would overshadow 
or replace the long-standing issue of water allocation, which is something considered by 
upstream states as a top-priority (Cascão et al, 2009, p. 65). 
5) It was difficult for some stakeholders to comprehend the idea of handling the benefit-and 
water-sharing paradigms simultaneously (Cascão et al, 2009, p. 65). 
6) Some decisions makers criticized the lack of coordination between the Socio-economic 
Development and Benefit Sharing (SDBS) program and existing investment projects (Cascão et 
al, 2009, p. 65). 
 82 
 
Chapter 6: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a benefit-sharing tool  
From the outset, the GERD has been promoted as a benefit-sharing project that will bring 
benefits to Ethiopia and its neighboring countries including Egypt and Sudan. According to the 
late Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, the GERD project was initially planned to be a 
jointly-owned project in which Egypt and Sudan would have contributed to its costs with 
percentages of 20% and 30% respectively, however, the conditions for such an arrangement did 
not exist (Tawfik, 2015, p. 11). Given that the GERD project has been unilaterally executed by 
the government of Ethiopia without prior consent from Egypt and Sudan, this chapter shall 
further examine if the GERD could still serve as a viable benefit-sharing project between the 
three countries. A cost-benefit analysis will be conducted in order to list the main potential 
advantages and disadvantages of the GERD on the three Blue Nile countries (Egypt, Ethiopia 
and Sudan). 
6.1: GERD: Cost-Benefit Analysis  
Generally, the construction of a dam project in an upstream country is a highly 
contentious issue as it may produce negative externalities to the downstream countries especially 
when the repercussions are not accurately reflected in the cost-benefit analysis of the country 
causing them (Dombrowsky et al, 2012, p. 5). Negative externalities may include reducing 
normal water flow to downstream countries that is used for agriculture, navigation or domestic 
consumption (Ibid). On the other hand, an upstream dam may also generate benefits to 
downstream countries when it improves flood management in the downstream part and produce 
favorable economic benefits to all pertinent riparians (Ibid).  
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Table 5: Dombrowsky’s upstream dams’ costs-benefit analysis  
Externalities of upstream dams in a downstream country 
Benefits to upstream state Externalities in downstream state  
Hydroelectricty  (-) changed flood and sedimentation regime 
(-) peak flows 
(-) seasonal imbalance  
Flood Control (-) changed flow and sedimentation regime 
(-) peak flows 
(+) regularized flow  
Irrigation/Drinking Water (-) changed flow and sedimentation regime 
(-) peak flows 
(-) seasonal imbalance 
(-) high to low water extractions 
(+) regularized flow  
Improved Navigability (+) increased trade 
Source: Dombrowsky et al, 2012, p. 5 
GERD anticipated benefits  
 Hydropower Generation  
As per the pronouncements of the Ethiopian government, power generation is the 
GERD’s primary objective which is expected to produce an electric power of 6000MW, with an 
annual energy production of 15130GWH (Tesfa, 2013, p. 4). The project is planned to be a 
source of clean and renewable energy for Ethiopia and other African countries including Egypt at 
much lower prices (Ibid, p. 6). Ethiopia has already negotiated power purchase agreements have 
with neighboring countries, including Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan and Tanzania 
(Donnenfeld, 2017). Consequently, this project could represent a promising step towards a more 
sustainable regional cooperation that may boost economic growth and welfare in Ethiopia and 
other Eastern Nile countries.  
Despite, Ethiopia’s endeavor to strengthen power trade relations with neighboring and 
even distant states, this goal is still far from reality as currently, the transmissions lines only 
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reach Sudan (International Non-Partisan Group, 2014, p.8). Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan need to 
start negotiating a power trade agreement followed by building transmission lines to deliver the 
GERD’s hydropower (Ibid). It is noteworthy that building the transmission lines would require 
strong financing and investment capabilities (Ibid). Moreover, timing is another crucial factor to 
be considered in this hydropower transmission plan (Ibid, p.9). As stated in the report, the 
establishment of transmission lines from the GERD to Sudan and Egypt is estimated to take a 
minimum of five years to be completed (Ibid).  
 Water Conservation and Flood Control  
 The GERD is projected to sustain a regular flow of the Nile waters to downstream 
countries which will benefit navigation and irrigation activities (Yihdego et al, 2017, p. 13). It is 
also expected to regulate floods during the wet season and improve water supply during the dry 
season from November to June (Ibid). 
Besides, the location of the GERD in the high lands is expected to reduce the amount of 
evaporated water in comparison with the Aswan High Dam which loses around 12% (14.3 billion 
cubic meters) due to evaporation (Yihdego et al, 2017, p. 9). According to some studies, the 
evaporated water in the Ethiopian highlands forms a cloud and feed the Nile back in the form of 
rains, whereas the evaporated water in the Aswan Dam is lost in the Sahara Desert (Tesfa, 2013, 
p. 10).  
In order to guarantee a regulated water flow with the presence the GERD, there needs to 
be a prompt plan to regulate the operations of the GERD with the downstream dams: Egypt’s 
Aswan High Dam (AHD) and Sudan’s Sennar and Rosiers dams (International Non-Partisan 
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Group, 2014, p. 3). Given that both the GERD and the AHD have two large, over-year storage 
reservoirs, it has become very critical to coordinate the filling plans between the two reservoirs 
especially during the dry seasons (Ibid, p.4). As Sudan lacks an over-year storage facility, it 
could face a major problem to secure its monthly water requirements during the filling phase of 
the GERD reservoir (Ibid).  
 Sedimentation Management  
Due to accumulation of sediments in the Sennar Dam of Sudan, the reservoir has lost 
around 71% of its water storage and electric-power generation capacity (Tesfa, 2013, p. 8). Same 
problem applies to the Roseires Dam which has lost around 36% of its operational capacity 
(Ibid). As for the Aswan High Dam (AHD) in Egypt, more than 6.285 billion tons of sediments 
were accumulated in its reservoir between years 1964 and 2008 which have impacted its capacity 
for electricity generation in addition to the high maintenance and dredging costs (Ibid). The 
government of Ethiopia contends that the GERD would reduce the sedimentation level in the 
Blue Nile by up to 86% which should be saving both Egypt and Sudan the large annual spending 
on dredging and maintenance operations (Ibid, p. 9). 
GERD anticipated costs  
In the case of the Grand Renaissance Dam, it is important to assess the potential costs on 
the downstream countries in general, and on Egypt in specific. According to the assessment 
report released by the IPoE, the GERD construction plan had not included an effective 
assessment of its impacts on downstream countries, “no downstream flow records and hydro-
meteorological information are given as would be needed to assess the downstream impacts of 
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the GERD project” (IPoE, 2013, p. 35). As mentioned in the IPoE report, the design of the 
GERD is shortsighted and gives much focus on power production and reservoir filling, but “does 
not consider environmental and socio- economic impacts downstream” (Ibid, p. 40). Long-term 
environmental and socio-economic impacts could include threats to fisheries and biodiversity, 
riverbed and banks erosion and other problems to the agriculture activities around the river (Ibid, 
p. 41).  
 Sustainability of Water Flow to Downstream States  
Although Ethiopia assures that the project is mainly constructed for power production, it 
is still uncertain whether Ethiopia will use the dam for irrigation purposes. The current Ethiopian 
Prime Minister, Helamariam Desalegn, contended that the GERD will be mainly used for 
hydropower production and not for irrigation purposes (Tawfik, 2015, p. 28). However, in one of 
former Prime Minister Zenawi’s speeches, he mentioned that the dam’s reservoir would “provide 
for extensive opportunities for fisheries and cultivation which were previously non-existent” 
(Ibid). Exploiting the dam for irrigation purposes will significantly impact water flow to 
downstream countries (Ibid).   
From Egypt’s perspective, the GERD is expected to tremendously reduce the flow of the 
water to the country especially during the filling period and due to the evaporation from the 
GERD itself (Yihdego et al, 2017, p. 9). The projected reduction of the water flow to Egypt is 
between 11 and 19 billion m3/year (Ibid). If the flood waters are stored in the GERD, it will 
reduce the water level in Lake Nasser and thus reduce the hydropower generated from the Aswan 
Dam (100 MW) (Ibid). Accordingly, Egypt will lose an overall of 25-40% of its electricity 
supply (Ibid). 
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The filling period of the dam is inversely proportional with the amount of water flow to 
the downstream countries (Schoeters, 2013, p. 40). In other words, a short filling period will 
strongly reduce the amount of water flow to the downstream (Ibid). This reduction in the water 
flow could create problems during the dry season. Thus, the three countries (Egypt, Ethiopia and 
Sudan) need to agree upon a reasonable filling period that guarantees no harm to any of the 
downstream states (Ibid). So far, Ethiopia did not disclose its filling plans and thus this is causing 
tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia especially that the project is almost complete.  
 Quality of the Nile Water 
One of the GERD potential benefits is preventing the accumulation of sediments in the 
downstream countries’ dams and reservoirs. However, the sediment accumulation in the GERD’s 
reservoir itself over the years is a serious issue that had not been carefully considered (Wolancho, 
2012, p. 5). The accumulation of sediments in the GERD will not only affect the project’s 
lifespan, but also it will affect the quality of the water flowing downstream (Ibid). Sediment is a 
critical pollutant which carries toxic elements that deteriorate the quality of the water and 
damages the aquatic ecosystem (Ibid).  
Ethiopia previously suffered from sediment accumulation in its reservoirs. One example 
is the Aba-Samuel dam which was one of the first power stations in Ethiopia (Wolancho, 2012 , 
p. 3). The dam lost half of its operational capacity due to sediment accumulation (Ibid). Another 
example is Koka dam and its reservoir in Addis Ababa which was specially constructed for 
hydropower generation. In 2000, the country experienced power cutouts as the dam was clogged 
with sediments (Ibid). Around 481 Mm3 of sediments were accumulated in the Koka dam 
displacing an equivalent amount of water with an estimated energy loss of 128 M KWh (Ibid). 
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 Quality of Cultivated Lands 
One of the claimed benefits of the GERD project is reducing the sedimentation level in 
the Blue Nile and thus enabling the Sennar Dam, Roseires Dam and the Aswan High Dam to 
restore their full operating capacities. This would definitely save Egypt and Sudan the time and 
money spent on annual maintenance, however, those sediments are rich in decomposed basalt 
and silts that have a great value in increasing soil fertility (Schoeters, 2013, p. 40). Consequently, 
the riverbank fields will be eroded and thus impacting the agriculture activities of this area (Ibid). 
This erosion could further lead to food insecurity problems (Ibid).  
 Resettlement  
Involuntary resettlement of people ihabiting the project area is one of the most 
challenging impacts of large dams construction (Schoeters, 2013, p. 32). Not only do the 
inhabitants lose their homes, but also they become subject to severe social challenges (Ibid, p. 
33). They can be deprived of their food, land, water resources, jobs and become vulnerable to 
various health risks (Ibid). Moreover, restteled communities add new pressures on their host 
communities as they consume more land, food and other living resources (Ibid). Additionally, 
new conflicts can emerge due to resource division between resettled residents (Ibid). On the one 
hand, the Ethiopian government contends that the GERD project will not cause any significant 
human settlements and therefore it will impose very minimal social and environmental risks 
(Ibid). On the other hand, a field survey conducted by International Rivers (2012) shows that the 
GERD will result in the resettelement of 5110 inhabitants who live in the dam area (cited in 
Schoeters, 2013, p. 33). In most cases, resettelement programs depend mainly on compensation 
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and mitigation rather than development which leave the resetteled communities worse off than 
before (Ibid). 
6.2: Concluding Remarks 
There is no doubt that unilateral construction of dam projects may act as a ‘game 
changer’ that challenges the status quo and affect the power balance between riparian states, 
however, this does not necessarily lead to an equitable system of sharing the river benefits. Given 
the aforementioned analysis of possible costs and benefits, the GERD holds uneven costs and 
benefits to Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. As far as the downstream states are concerned, the GERD 
construction plan has not been based on any comprehensive cost-benefit-calculus and thus it 
hardly considered potential effects on downstream countries. It also lacks clear studies on its 
impacts on Ethiopia, on downstream countries, and on the river itself. Even after the IPoE’s 
studies and recommendations, Ethiopia refused to halt construction until the assessment of the 
project is completed. This has definitely increased the level of mistrust between Egypt and 
Ethiopia and complicated negotiations around the rules of filling and operating the dam. 
Although the concept of benefit-sharing suggests a change from the volumetric allocation 
of water to the allocation of shared benefits, it should not compromise the water security of the 
states that are fully dependent on the river. As discussed by Dombrowsky et al (2012, p. 10), a 
necessary precondition for a successful benefit-sharing project is creating more benefits of 
cooperation than those of unilateral actions. In other words, it needs to make all pertinent parties 
better off with a benefit-sharing deal than without (Ibid, p. 3). As previously discussed, the 
GERD does not fulfill this equation due to its uneven net benefits as well as other environmental 
and societal impacts. 
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Therefore, there should be a broad framework of cooperation, as proposed by the benefit-
sharing model, to include more equitable and fair benefits in order to build trust between Egypt, 
Ethiopia and Sudan. A rapprochement over the GERD is an important step to harness brotherly 
relations between the three Blue Nile countries, but more importantly it is a wake-up call for the 
three countries to embark on further economic and political cooperation. Increasing trade 
relations and investments have been proposed by politicians and technical experts as a solution to 
water conflicts. In the next chapter, possible beyond the river opportunities will be discussed in 
order to reach possible reciprocal benefits between the three countries.   
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Chapter 7: Cooperation Beyond the Nile River 
 This chapter aims to highlight opportunities of cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia 
beyond the Nile file. Referring to the theory of issue linkage, the current issue of the Grand 
Renaissance Dam needs be linked to broader water and non-water issues where the two countries 
could generate reciprocal benefits. Issue linkage shall offer new venues of cooperation and 
tradeoffs, so that the two countries could expand their basket of benefits. Hence, this chapter will 
focus on the fourth type of the benefit sharing model which is benefits beyond the river. 
 
 It is worth noting that the bilateral relations between Egypt and Ethiopia have always 
been comprehensive and have never been limited to the Nile River. As the late Ethiopian Prime 
Minister, Meles Zenawi, described it, it is a “catholic marriage in which divorce is unthinkable9” 
(cited in Yigzaw, 2011, p. 51). Relations between the two countries goes back to the time when 
the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo was under the administration of the Egyptian Coptic 
Orthodox Church until 1959 when it became independent and had its own patriarch (Dibaba, 
2016). Ethiopian Muslims are also very close to Al-Azhar in Cairo who go there to study Islamic 
Sciences (Ibid).  
 Besides religious and cultural ties, economic relations have played an important role in 
the history of the two nations. In 1905, the National Bank of Egypt supported the establishment 
of Ethiopia’s first bank “the Bank of Abyssinia” (Dibaba, 2016). The bank firstly operated as an 
affiliate of the National Bank of Egypt until it was handed over to the government of Ethiopia 
under the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1930 (Ibid). 
                                                 
99 Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in an interview with the Egyptian TV in July 2010 
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 In terms of trade and investments in modern times, there is a considerable number of 
Egyptian investments in Ethiopia that are run by Egyptian companies in different industries. One 
notable example is ElSewedy Cables Holding Co. which has ongoing large investments in the 
energy sector in Ethiopia. Meeting the growing demand of energy and cables market in Ethiopia, 
the company invested $50M in ElSewedy Cables Ethiopia PLC10. The Arab Contractors 
Company also opened an office in Ethiopia with plans to build two major roads in Ethiopia with 
a budget of $110M being primarily funded by the African Development Bank11.     
Despite the existence of various opportunities for cooperation between the two countries, 
these opportunities have not been exploited in an effective way that could generate mutual 
benefits. Theoretically speaking, it should be possible to reinforce regional development in the 
Blue Nile Sub-basin based on the comparative advantages in each country that should induce 
more trade and investment deals (Wichelns et al, 2003, p. 545). Egypt has very skilled human 
resources and advanced technical experience in diverse fields such as medicine and agricultural 
technology (Ibid). Ethiopia is rich with agricultural products and livestock and the country is 
endowed with a surplus of labor force (Ibid). Setting aside long-standing water-sharing problems 
in the region, this chapter discusses several cooperation opportunities that might offer pragmatic 
solutions to promote sustainable cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia and overcome future 
conflicts. 
                                                 
10 This information is posted on ElSewedy Electric Official Website, retrieved on December 1st, 2017 
11 This information is retrieved from the official website of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, last checked 
on December 2nd, 2017 
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7.1: Technical and Scientific Cooperation 
 One very important aspect of cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia is technical 
cooperation and the exchange of the know-how (Al-Saidi et al, 2017, p. 112). The African 
Region is subject to critical future challenges such as those related to climate change and the 
Blue Nile Sub-basin is no exception (Ibid. p. 113). Thus, the two countries need to cooperate to 
create a hydro-climatic infrastructure to be able to study, monitor and mitigate climate-related 
risks such as floods and droughts (Ibid). Currently, full access to information, frequent reporting 
and exchange of data among Nile riparian states is either very limited or underdeveloped (Ibid). 
Accordingly, transboundary collaboration is necessary to improve the role of pertinent ministries 
and research institutions through capacity-building workshops and training (Ibid).  
 Technology and scientific cooperation should not be confined only to the field of hydro-
meteorological services, it should extend to other important domains such as health and 
education (Ayenew, 2015, p. 33). In the Blue Nile Sub-basin, Egypt is considered to be a leading 
country when it comes to advanced research and technology (Ibid). Egyptian universities and 
research institutions are very well equipped to host Ethiopian and Sudanese researchers to get 
trained in Egypt (Ibid).  
7.2: Health Cooperation  
As mentioned in the previous section, Egypt has a strong comparative advantage in the 
field of technology and science which gives it great opportunity to lead cooperative initiatives 
with its African neighbors in various domains including health and medicine. Some of these 
initiatives are already taking place and among them is a series of medical convoys led by the 
Egyptian heart surgeon Sir Magdi Yacoub with a 27-member team to perform cardiac surgeries 
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for those in need in Ethiopia (State Information Service, 2017). This initiative has started since 
2014 and is still continuing (Ibid). The project is led by the Magdi Yacoub Foundation in 
collaboration with the Egyptian Agency of Partnership for Development (EAPD)12 and the 
Cardiac Center of Ethiopia (Ibid).  
Another ongoing initiative in the health domain is led by the Egyptian 57357 Health 
Sciences Academy in collaboration with the EAPD to train and assess pediatric oncology 
hospitals in Ethiopia and Kenya (All Africa, 2016). The training includes different courses on 
clinical pharmacy, nursing, child care and health care equipment (Ibid).  
All these initiatives are very positive and promising; however, they are mostly done on a 
project-by-project basis without clear long-term plans. These initiatives should be incorporated in 
a bigger plan to further strengthen Egypt’s relations with Ethiopia and other African states. 
Therefore, health projects need to cover wider specializations and be scheduled on more regular 
basis. They should also follow an organized agenda, so that the outcomes of such projects 
become more effective and structured. 
7.3: Investments and Trade Cooperation 
 
 In the Blue Nile Sub-basin, there are promising investment scenarios in different sectors 
depending on each country’s resources and expertise (Al-Saidi et al, 2017, p. 112). For instance, 
Ethiopia is rich in arable land resources that open the door to many opportunities of land 
investments which are mainly used for food production (Ibid). Land investments in Ethiopia 
                                                 
12 The Egyptian Agency of Partnership for Development (EAPD) was established in July 1st, 2014 as part of the 
Egyptian foreign policy towards Africa. The EAPD is mandated to organize workshops and training to the Islamic 
and African states, provide technical and humanitarian assistance, assist in financing African developmental projects 
and cooperate with the UN agencies on related projects.   
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account for almost 1 million hectares (Ibid). In recent years, Ethiopia have been very active in 
promoting land investments as part of its development plan, so this can be a good investment 
opportunity for Egypt (Ibid). Investing in arable land have become very strategic especially with 
the mounting food demands in Africa (Ibid, p. 13). Here, the need for regional cooperation 
become very critical in order to increase agricultural efficiencies (Ibid).  
 A second possibility involves the investment in the irrigation facilities. Egypt has around 
4.4 million hectares of cultivable areas which are almost entirely dependent on irrigation (Al-
Saidi et al, 2017, p. 112). Thus, the country has well-established experience with modern 
irrigation systems such as sprinkler and drip irrigation that can be used to optimize irrigation 
infrastructure in Ethiopia (Ibid, p. 113). Ethiopia as well needs investements in its irrigation 
system as 20.5 percent of its total cultivable area (13.2 million hectares) is suitable for irrigation. 
Hence, agricultural production in Ethiopia is to a large extent dependent on rainfall which vary 
substantially from one year to another (Wichelns et al, 2003, p. 544). Investments in irrigation 
facilities in Ethiopia would considerably enhance the volume of its agricultural products and 
livestock, and in turn this should provide Egypt with more affordable exports of agricultural and 
meat products (Ibid, p. 547). This can be a good opportunity for Egypt to consolidate its relations 
with Ethiopia by enhancing their agricultural activities and exporting the know-how with regards 
to irrigation technologies.  
 A third opportunity involves negotiating free trade agreements that enable the three 
countries to import and export products with minimal restrictions (Wichelns et al, 2003, p. 549). 
Despite the variety in products and resources in each of Egypt and Ethiopia, the level of imports 
and exports between them is still very limited. For instance, Egypt imports around 40 percent of 
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meat products from many countries around the world to meet its national demands for production 
and consumption (Ayenew, 2015, p. 33). Whereas Ethiopia alone has the capacity to cover 
Egypt’s demand of meat as it is a large livestock producer (Ibid). Besides, Egypt is a major 
importer of food crops including sugar, wheat and coffee which Ethiopia produces in large 
amounts and thus has enough capacity to export them to Egypt (Ibid). Food-related trade or what 
is known as ‘Virtual Water Trade’ in the Blue Nile Sub-basin is very critical to ease pressures on 
the Nile River waters (Al-Saidi et al, 2017, p. 112).  
 A fourth scenario includes trade in energy resources. Egypt has moderate reserves of oil 
and gas and it exports more than 150,000 oil barrels per day (Ayenew, 2015, p. 33), whereas 
Ethiopia have very limited oil reserves and each import large amounts of oil to meet their 
national demands (Al-Saidi et al, 2017, p. 112). This could be a trade opportunity between Egypt 
and its Blue Nile neighbors. On the other hand, Ethiopia has rich agricultural lands that can be 
used to produce biofuels (Ibid). Trade in biofuels introduces an interesting energy source to be 
included in bilateral trade agreements between Egypt and Ethiopia. 
Current Trend of Trade activities between Egypt and Ethiopia  
The bilateral trade activities between Egypt and Ethiopia have significantly increased due 
to the preferential arrangement under the Common Market for East and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) (Ebaidalla, 2016, p. 5). The political turmoil caused by the announcement of the 
GERD construction has certainly affected the trade and economic relations between Egypt and 
Ethiopia in a negative way, however, the economic tensions had not lasted for so long as the two 
countries have instead used trade and investment as remedial ‘pacifying’ tool. Despite this 
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notable increase, the bilateral trade between the two countries is still considered limited in 
comparison with the trend of the bilateral trade deals between each of the two countries and their 
other trade partners. It is noteworthy that Egypt’s exports to Ethiopia tremendously exceeds its 
imports between years 2011 and 2016 (Figure 7). This traditional view of the African Market as 
an exclusively export market needs to change. Egypt needs to invest more in industrial and 
infrastructure projects in Ethiopia and other African countries.  
Figure 7: Trend of trade between Egypt and Ethiopia from 2011-2016
 
 
Table 6: Egypt’s Top Trading Partners (2016) 
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Top Export Partners (2016) Top Import Partners (2016) 
United Arab Emirates China 
Italy United Arab Emirates 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), 2017 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), 2017 
 98 
 
Table 7: Ethiopia’s Top Trading Partners (2016) 
 
 
 
Ethiopia 
Top Export Partners (2016) Top Import Partners (2016) 
Sudan China 
Netherlands Saudi Arabia 
China India 
Somalia Kuwait 
Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates 
 
Main Challenges to Free Trade Agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia  
- Long-standing water tensions between the three countries is a significant impediment to 
any successful trade arrangement (Ebaidalla, 2016, p. 10). The ups and downs in the 
hydropolitical relations between Egypt and Ethiopia have slowed down the pace of any 
development or integration process (Ibid).  
- Poor infrastructural systems between the two countries whether physical (e.g. roads) or 
soft (e.g. ICTs) hampers the process of exports and imports (Ebaidalla, 2016, p. 10). 
There have been some attempts to enhance road connectivity between the two countries, 
however, these efforts have not been significantly impactful (Ibid).  
- Trade taxes are considered another critical impediment to strong trade relations between 
Egypt and Ethiopia (Ebaidalla, 2016, p. 10). The two countries hugely depend on trade 
taxes as an important source of government revenues (Ibid). Removing trade taxes will 
thus lead to significant output and employment losses (Ibid).   
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), 2017. 
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7.4: Concluding Remarks  
 This chapter aimed to highlight the basket of benefits that Egypt and Ethiopia could 
produce when the countries cooperate beyond the Nile File. When negotiating a water-related 
issue such as the GERD case, the two countries need to have a wide-range of identified 
reciprocal benefits in order to allow for more equitable and systematic decisions. In the 
Egyptian-Ethiopian context, Ethiopia needs to increase its allocation of water for development 
and Egypt wants to maintain its current shares of the Nile waters to meet its mounting 
consumption needs. If each country’s issue is considered separately, it could easily emerge as all 
or nothing (win-lose or lose-lose) results. But when each issue is linked to broader mutual 
benefits, this could possibly lead to win-win outcomes as additional benefits can be shared. 
Identifying a basket of shared benefits means opportunities can be flexibly modified until the two 
negotiating parties arrive at pragmatic forms of cooperation. On the other hand, negotiating a 
single issue means that the two parties can easily reach a stalemate or a zero-sum output.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Recommendations 
As the story is recited “One time, there was a scorpion who wanted to cross the river. He 
asked many animals for help, but they all refused to help him until the sheep accepted to do it 
given that the scorpion promised not to sting him during the crossing or else they would both 
sink. In the middle of the river, the scorpion stung the sheep and the sheep cried “why?” the 
scorpion answered “I could not do anything else, I am a scorpion” (cited in Yohannes & 
Yohannes, 2012, p. 205). 
Regardless of who is the scorpion and who is the sheep in the ongoing Nile tensions, this 
research argues that it is very important for Egypt and Ethiopia to reach a sustainble cooperative 
framework instead of intensifying water disputes. The study selects the benefit-sharing model 
and the issue linkage theory as its conceptual framework with an aim to move beyond the narrow 
perspective of the water-sharing concept and instead adopting a more inclusive perspective that 
guarantees overall benefits to all parties involved. As the research has shown, the benefit-sharing 
model is not a novel concept to the Nile Basin and the Nile states have achieved considerable 
progress in applying it on both basin and sub-basin levels. However, the implementation of the 
concept had been the real challenge due to Nile countries‘ preocuupation with water-allocation 
issues and the lack of necessary experience and funds to carry out benefit-sharing projects. If 
Egypt and Ethiopia opt for benefit-sharing as a solution to their water issues, the two countries 
need to start off with creating an environment of sound cooperation. 
The research findings show that the GERD project does not promise even benefits 
between Egypt and Ethiopia, however it represents a wake-up call for the two countries to start 
looking beyond the Nile River in order to search for more common opportunities. Hence, this 
study argues that the current issue of the GERD needs to be allocated within a broader 
framework of cooperation in order to create more opportuities for mutual cooperation. Linking 
the issue of the GERD to other water and non-water issues will allow the negotiating parties to 
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reach satisfying trade-offs. As discussed in chapter 7, Egypt and Ethiopia have a number of 
comparitive advantages that encourage strong benefit-sharing deals in various fields.  
Based on the lessons learned from previous cooperation attempts in the Nile Basin, this 
study proposes three recommendations in order to ensure effective benefit-sharing relations 
between Egypt and Ethiopia. It is very essential to start with building a strong and professional 
cadre of water experts who understand transboundary water issues and have the skills to find 
technical and immediate solutions to any water-related problems. Capacity development should 
ensure that the two countries have equal skills and knowledge concerning all water-related issues 
and opportunities. Secondly, transparent information sharing and trust building are key pillars to 
any successful benefit-sharing and cooperation agreements. Information sharing should not be 
confined only to hydrological and environmental information, it should include other important 
economic and social data as well. Open dialogue and information sharing become necessary in 
order to strengthen the level of trust and confidence among the two countries and eventually 
allow for overall successful and satisfying outcomes. Thirdly, regular monitoring and evaluation 
to both short-term and long-term cooperative projects should be in place in order to identify 
potential opportunities and constraints and allow for quick remedial actions. Evaluation 
techniques need to be both quantitative and qualitative. 
Finally, this study proposes future research on successful water governance systems. The 
Nile Basin countries have attempted to build governance systems to regulate the Nile affairs, 
however, those attempts had not been successful enough to accomodate the interests of all the 
Nile riparians. A strong governance system is a very critical prerequisite to any sustainble wter 
cooperation. As Nile riparians cannot reach consensus on neither the 1959 water treaty nor the 
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CFA, more future research is needed on figuring at successful legal mechanisms for the Nile 
Basin states that secure and guarantee fair benefits to all riparian states 
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